Weak pairwise justifiability as a common root of Arrow’s and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorems
We introduce a novel principle that we call weak pairwise justifiability, which applies to a large class of collective choice rules, including the social choice functions and the social welfare functions about which the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem and Arrow’s impossibility theorem are predicated,...
| Autores: | , , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2025 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repositorio: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:10256/26378 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10256/26378 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Gibbard-Satterthwaite, Teoria de Gibbard-Satterthwaite theory Arrow, Paradoxa de Arrow paradox Decisió multicriteri Multiple criteria decision making |
| Sumario: | We introduce a novel principle that we call weak pairwise justifiability, which applies to a large class of collective choice rules, including the social choice functions and the social welfare functions about which the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem and Arrow’s impossibility theorem are predicated, respectively. We prove that, under appropriate qualifications, our principle is a common root for these two classical results, when applied to rules defined over the full domain of weak preference orders (also for strict) |
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