La unidad de nuestro ser como cuestión fundamental de la antropología filosófica: Robert Spaemann y la crítica del Cogito cartesiano
The unity of the human person is adequately affirmed when the notion of life is recovered. An opposition between subjectivity and body makes dualism insuperable. On the other hand, life is both interiority and exteriority. The interiority which is proper to consciousness implies a qualitative leap....
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| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Data de publicação: | 2008 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universidad de Navarra |
| Repositório: | Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra |
| Idioma: | espanhol |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:dadun.unav.edu:10171/22397 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/10171/22397 |
| Access Level: | Acceso aberto |
| Palavra-chave: | Spaemann, Robert Vida Biología Subjetividad Consciencia |
| Resumo: | The unity of the human person is adequately affirmed when the notion of life is recovered. An opposition between subjectivity and body makes dualism insuperable. On the other hand, life is both interiority and exteriority. The interiority which is proper to consciousness implies a qualitative leap. Nevertheless, human unity becomes thinkable in the following terms: reason or consciousness is the form of life, i.e. the particular power which bring life to consummation. |
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