Detecting bid rigging in public auctions for procuring infrastructure projects: formulating the reference scenario for decision-making

[EN] Bid rigging is a fraudulent scheme in procurement auctions resulting in non-competitive bids awarded at prices above the competitive market. Bid rigging is a global problem that wastes public agencies' resources and taxpayers' money. While various methods and tools have been d...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Signor, Regis, Love, Peter E.D., Ballesteros-Pérez, Pablo|||0000-0002-4629-9664
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2024
País:España
Institución:Universitat Politècnica de València (UPV)
Repositorio:RiuNet. Repositorio Institucional de la Universitat Politécnica de Valéncia
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:riunet.upv.es:10251/221248
Acceso en línea:https://riunet.upv.es/handle/10251/221248
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Bid rigging
Collusion
Infrastructure
Procurement
Reference scenario
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Descripción
Sumario:[EN] Bid rigging is a fraudulent scheme in procurement auctions resulting in non-competitive bids awarded at prices above the competitive market. Bid rigging is a global problem that wastes public agencies' resources and taxpayers' money. While various methods and tools have been developed to detect bid rigging, it remains challenging for public agencies to identify what a competitive baseline auction looks like in the absence of collusion. Such a baseline is commonly known as a reference scenario, which involves analyzing the behavior of honest bids in previous auctions to determine if future bids could be collusive. Research on formulating reliable reference scenarios for bid rigging detection in the auctions of infrastructure projects has received limited attention. Hence, our paper analyses the key criteria required to develop a reference scenario for public agencies to detect bid rigging during an auction. Drawing on data from Brazilian public procurement and oversight agencies, a procedure for composing robust reference scenarios for detecting bid rigging in infrastructure first-priced auctions is presented and discussed. We then test our procedure's generalizability using data from four countries (Australia, Brazil, Spain, and the United States) in two auction formats (i.e., capped and uncapped). A better understanding of the reference scenario formulation will allow public officials to increase the likelihood of detecting bid rigging when it exists and avoid flagging it as such when no collusive practices are involved.