Impression management in corporate annual reports during the global financial crisis
This paper analyses impression management (IM) during the global financial crisis (GFC). It examines the differences in multiple textual characteristics and attributions between a highly positive performance period (2002–2007) and the GFC period (2008–2012), within the setting of Spain, where these...
| Autores: | , |
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2022 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universidad de Jaén |
| Repositorio: | RUJA. Repositorio Institucional de la Producción Científica de la Universidad de Jaén |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ruja.ujaen.es:10953/5836 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.emj.2021.08.007 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026323732100116X?via%3Dihub https://hdl.handle.net/10953/5836 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Accounting narratives Attributions Crisis Impression management President’s letter Readability M41, H12 |
| Resumo: | This paper analyses impression management (IM) during the global financial crisis (GFC). It examines the differences in multiple textual characteristics and attributions between a highly positive performance period (2002–2007) and the GFC period (2008–2012), within the setting of Spain, where these two economic cycles were extreme. In contrast to previous research, companies’ extreme poor performance in our sample is driven by an exogenous event. The findings do not show clear evidence of IM based on textual characteristics specifically linked to the GFC. Companies tried not to use overt IM and, to some extent, tried to clarify the impact of the crisis on performance. They were under great scrutiny and probably preferred to tell a more careful story. However, a general pattern of IM was still present during the GFC in the form of consistent positive attributions, favourable benchmarks and enhancement practices. In essence, the crisis did not fully stop IM practices, but rather influenced the way IM was produced. Overall, our results show that IM was lower during the GFC than in the case of poor performance in normal macroeconomic conditions found by previous literature. The results also show that the narratives of firms in the finance and real estate sectors were the most reactive to the GFC, probably linked to their key role in the crisis. |
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