Cartels, board gender composition and gender quotas

Cartel busting often results in the restructuring of boards of directors, presumably to remove individuals (both executive and non-executive members) who may have been involved in the cartel. This study employs 2 exogenous changes—cartel busting and binding board gender quotas policies—to examine th...

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Authors: García Galindo, Carmen, Borrell, Joan-Ramon, Jiménez González, Juan Luis, Ordóñez de Haro, José Manuel
Format: article
Status:Versión aceptada para publicación
Publication Date:2024
Country:España
Institution:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repository:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:2445/221485
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/221485
Access Level:Open access
Keyword:Estudis de gènere
Dret de la competència
Càrtels
Gender studies
Antitrust law
Cartels
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spelling Cartels, board gender composition and gender quotasGarcía Galindo, CarmenBorrell, Joan-RamonJiménez González, Juan LuisOrdóñez de Haro, José ManuelEstudis de gènereDret de la competènciaCàrtelsGender studiesAntitrust lawCartelsCartel busting often results in the restructuring of boards of directors, presumably to remove individuals (both executive and non-executive members) who may have been involved in the cartel. This study employs 2 exogenous changes—cartel busting and binding board gender quotas policies—to examine their impact on board gender composition using DiD and Staggered DiD methods. In countries with binding quotas, boards are already undergoing restructuring to include more women, even without the shock of cartel busting. Furthermore, boards increase the percentage of women in non-cartelized firms only when countries introduce binding gender quotas. Binding board gender quota regulations are effective in improving gender balance on corporate boards. Additionally, in countries without binding board gender quotas, only firms sanctioned for cartel conduct show an increase in the percentage of women after cartel busting, compared to non-sanctioned firms. Thus, board gender quota regulations and anti-cartel policies interact to influence the gender composition of sanctioned firms: binding gender policies are effective in achieving more balanced board gender composition, and cartel busting drives more balanced boards in sanctioned firms regardless of whether their countries have binding board quota regulations or notSpringer Verlag2025202520242025info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion38 p.application/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/221485Articles publicats en revistes (Econometria, Estadística i Economia Aplicada)reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunyainstname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)InglésReproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-024-09815-xEuropean Journal of Law and Economics, 2024, vol. 58, p. 283-320https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-024-09815-x(c) Springer Verlag, 2024http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:recercat.cat:2445/2214852026-05-29T05:05:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Cartels, board gender composition and gender quotas
title Cartels, board gender composition and gender quotas
spellingShingle Cartels, board gender composition and gender quotas
García Galindo, Carmen
Estudis de gènere
Dret de la competència
Càrtels
Gender studies
Antitrust law
Cartels
title_short Cartels, board gender composition and gender quotas
title_full Cartels, board gender composition and gender quotas
title_fullStr Cartels, board gender composition and gender quotas
title_full_unstemmed Cartels, board gender composition and gender quotas
title_sort Cartels, board gender composition and gender quotas
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv García Galindo, Carmen
Borrell, Joan-Ramon
Jiménez González, Juan Luis
Ordóñez de Haro, José Manuel
author García Galindo, Carmen
author_facet García Galindo, Carmen
Borrell, Joan-Ramon
Jiménez González, Juan Luis
Ordóñez de Haro, José Manuel
author_role author
author2 Borrell, Joan-Ramon
Jiménez González, Juan Luis
Ordóñez de Haro, José Manuel
author2_role author
author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Estudis de gènere
Dret de la competència
Càrtels
Gender studies
Antitrust law
Cartels
topic Estudis de gènere
Dret de la competència
Càrtels
Gender studies
Antitrust law
Cartels
description Cartel busting often results in the restructuring of boards of directors, presumably to remove individuals (both executive and non-executive members) who may have been involved in the cartel. This study employs 2 exogenous changes—cartel busting and binding board gender quotas policies—to examine their impact on board gender composition using DiD and Staggered DiD methods. In countries with binding quotas, boards are already undergoing restructuring to include more women, even without the shock of cartel busting. Furthermore, boards increase the percentage of women in non-cartelized firms only when countries introduce binding gender quotas. Binding board gender quota regulations are effective in improving gender balance on corporate boards. Additionally, in countries without binding board gender quotas, only firms sanctioned for cartel conduct show an increase in the percentage of women after cartel busting, compared to non-sanctioned firms. Thus, board gender quota regulations and anti-cartel policies interact to influence the gender composition of sanctioned firms: binding gender policies are effective in achieving more balanced board gender composition, and cartel busting drives more balanced boards in sanctioned firms regardless of whether their countries have binding board quota regulations or not
publishDate 2024
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2024
2025
2025
2025
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/221485
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/221485
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-024-09815-x
European Journal of Law and Economics, 2024, vol. 58, p. 283-320
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-024-09815-x
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv (c) Springer Verlag, 2024
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv (c) Springer Verlag, 2024
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv 38 p.
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer Verlag
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer Verlag
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Econometria, Estadística i Economia Aplicada)
reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
instname_str Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
reponame_str Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
collection Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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