Does urban design drive sympathy for the far right?
The far right has now entered into the mainstream politics of nearly every European country, yet we have confirmed little about the social context in which far-right parties thrive. While most of the literature assumes that far-right sympathies are driven by economic or cultural grievance, this pape...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2024 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repositorio: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:10230/59238 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10230/59238 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ccs.2023.100553 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Urban design Segregation Right-wing extremism Diversity |
| Sumario: | The far right has now entered into the mainstream politics of nearly every European country, yet we have confirmed little about the social context in which far-right parties thrive. While most of the literature assumes that far-right sympathies are driven by economic or cultural grievance, this paper looks to cities and contact theory. Recent advances suggest that even indirect or vicarious intergroup contact can reduce prejudice toward out-groups such as migrants. Urban theorists, as well, have long argued that urban design can influence social outcomes by promoting or discouraging interaction between residents. This paper applies this literature to the rise of the far right, which often scapegoats out-groups in its rhetoric. Using data from 73 cities in Spain, we find that residents of cities rich in continuous urban fabric—which promotes contact—are less likely to consider voting for the far right but that this relationship is weaker in highly segregated cities. |
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