The definition of assertion: Commitment and truth

According to an influential view, asserting a proposition involves undertaking some “commitment” to the truth of that proposition. But accounts of what it is for someone to be committed to the truth of a proposition are often vague or imprecise, and are rarely put to work to define assertion. This a...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor: Marsili, Neri
Formato: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2024
País:España
Recursos:Universidad de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
OAI Identifier:oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/217260
Acesso em linha:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/217260
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:Justificació (Teoria del coneixement)
Negació (Lògica)
Representació del coneixement (Teoria de la informació)
Justification (Theory of Knowledge)
Negation (Logic)
Knowledge representation (Information theory)
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repository_id_str
spelling The definition of assertion: Commitment and truthMarsili, NeriJustificació (Teoria del coneixement)Negació (Lògica)Representació del coneixement (Teoria de la informació)Justification (Theory of Knowledge)Negation (Logic)Knowledge representation (Information theory)According to an influential view, asserting a proposition involves undertaking some “commitment” to the truth of that proposition. But accounts of what it is for someone to be committed to the truth of a proposition are often vague or imprecise, and are rarely put to work to define assertion. This article aims to fill this gap. It offers a precise characterisation of assertoric commitment, and applies it to define assertion. On the proposed view, acquiring commitment is not sufficient for asserting: To assert, commitment must be acquired by explicitly presenting a proposition as true.John Wiley & Sons2024info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/217260Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UBinstname:Universidad de BarcelonaInglésReproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12476Mind & Language, 2024, vol. 39, num.4, p. 540-560https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12476cc-by-nc-nd (c) Marsili, Neri, 2024http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/2172602026-05-27T06:46:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The definition of assertion: Commitment and truth
title The definition of assertion: Commitment and truth
spellingShingle The definition of assertion: Commitment and truth
Marsili, Neri
Justificació (Teoria del coneixement)
Negació (Lògica)
Representació del coneixement (Teoria de la informació)
Justification (Theory of Knowledge)
Negation (Logic)
Knowledge representation (Information theory)
title_short The definition of assertion: Commitment and truth
title_full The definition of assertion: Commitment and truth
title_fullStr The definition of assertion: Commitment and truth
title_full_unstemmed The definition of assertion: Commitment and truth
title_sort The definition of assertion: Commitment and truth
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Marsili, Neri
author Marsili, Neri
author_facet Marsili, Neri
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Justificació (Teoria del coneixement)
Negació (Lògica)
Representació del coneixement (Teoria de la informació)
Justification (Theory of Knowledge)
Negation (Logic)
Knowledge representation (Information theory)
topic Justificació (Teoria del coneixement)
Negació (Lògica)
Representació del coneixement (Teoria de la informació)
Justification (Theory of Knowledge)
Negation (Logic)
Knowledge representation (Information theory)
description According to an influential view, asserting a proposition involves undertaking some “commitment” to the truth of that proposition. But accounts of what it is for someone to be committed to the truth of a proposition are often vague or imprecise, and are rarely put to work to define assertion. This article aims to fill this gap. It offers a precise characterisation of assertoric commitment, and applies it to define assertion. On the proposed view, acquiring commitment is not sufficient for asserting: To assert, commitment must be acquired by explicitly presenting a proposition as true.
publishDate 2024
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2024
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/217260
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/217260
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12476
Mind & Language, 2024, vol. 39, num.4, p. 540-560
https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12476
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv cc-by-nc-nd (c) Marsili, Neri, 2024
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv cc-by-nc-nd (c) Marsili, Neri, 2024
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv John Wiley & Sons
publisher.none.fl_str_mv John Wiley & Sons
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
instname:Universidad de Barcelona
instname_str Universidad de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de la UB
collection Dipòsit Digital de la UB
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15,811543

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