A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes

We consider a package allocation problem in which a seller owns many indivisible objects and the rest of the agents, buyers, are interested in packages of these objects. Buyers' valuations satisfy monotonicity and the gross substitutes condition (Kelso and Crawford, 1982). The aim of this paper...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva), Rafels, Carles, Robles Jiménez, Francisco Javier
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2020
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
OAI Identifier:oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/154514
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/154514
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Economia matemàtica
Assignació d'actius
Equilibri (Economia)
Mathematical economics
Asset allocation
Equilibrium (Economics)
id ES_e3e3d4c8f6e03e047ccac4bb644c984d
oai_identifier_str oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/154514
network_acronym_str ES
network_name_str España
repository_id_str
spelling A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutesNúñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)Rafels, CarlesRobles Jiménez, Francisco JavierEconomia matemàticaAssignació d'actiusEquilibri (Economia)Mathematical economicsAsset allocationEquilibrium (Economics)We consider a package allocation problem in which a seller owns many indivisible objects and the rest of the agents, buyers, are interested in packages of these objects. Buyers' valuations satisfy monotonicity and the gross substitutes condition (Kelso and Crawford, 1982). The aim of this paper is to analyze the following mechanism: simultaneously, each buyer requests to the seller a package by announcing how much he would pay for it; once buyers have played, the seller decides the final assignment of packages and the prices, as long as this assignment makes no buyer worse off than with his initial request. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism correspond to the Vickrey outcome (Vickrey, 1961) of the market.Elsevier B.V.2020info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/154514Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UBinstname:Universidad de BarcelonaInglésVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.11.002Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2020, vol. 87, num. March, p. 6-14https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.11.002cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2020http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/esinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/1545142026-05-27T06:46:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes
title A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes
spellingShingle A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes
Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)
Economia matemàtica
Assignació d'actius
Equilibri (Economia)
Mathematical economics
Asset allocation
Equilibrium (Economics)
title_short A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes
title_full A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes
title_fullStr A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes
title_full_unstemmed A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes
title_sort A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)
Rafels, Carles
Robles Jiménez, Francisco Javier
author Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)
author_facet Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)
Rafels, Carles
Robles Jiménez, Francisco Javier
author_role author
author2 Rafels, Carles
Robles Jiménez, Francisco Javier
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Economia matemàtica
Assignació d'actius
Equilibri (Economia)
Mathematical economics
Asset allocation
Equilibrium (Economics)
topic Economia matemàtica
Assignació d'actius
Equilibri (Economia)
Mathematical economics
Asset allocation
Equilibrium (Economics)
description We consider a package allocation problem in which a seller owns many indivisible objects and the rest of the agents, buyers, are interested in packages of these objects. Buyers' valuations satisfy monotonicity and the gross substitutes condition (Kelso and Crawford, 1982). The aim of this paper is to analyze the following mechanism: simultaneously, each buyer requests to the seller a package by announcing how much he would pay for it; once buyers have played, the seller decides the final assignment of packages and the prices, as long as this assignment makes no buyer worse off than with his initial request. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism correspond to the Vickrey outcome (Vickrey, 1961) of the market.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2020
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/154514
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/154514
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.11.002
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2020, vol. 87, num. March, p. 6-14
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.11.002
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2020
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2020
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier B.V.
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier B.V.
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)
reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
instname:Universidad de Barcelona
instname_str Universidad de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de la UB
collection Dipòsit Digital de la UB
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1869422542697005056
score 15,300724

Similares en LA Referencia