The origin of wealth matters: Equity norms trump equality norms in the ultimatum game with earned endowments

We conduct an ultimatum game with three treatments: one in which endowments are earned through a real effort task (answering spelling questions under time pressure), one in which endowments are awarded through lotteries, and a standard ultimatum game with exogenously provided wealth. When subjects e...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Barber, Benjamin, English, William
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2019
País:España
Institución:IE
Repositorio:Repositorio IE
OAI Identifier:oai:repositorio.ie.edu:20.500.14417/3429
Acceso en línea:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.008
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3429
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Ultimatum game
Norms
Equity theory
Inequity aversion
Earned endowments
53 Ciencias Económicas::5304 Actividad económica::5304.02 Distribución
ODS 10 - Reducción de las desigualdades
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spelling The origin of wealth matters: Equity norms trump equality norms in the ultimatum game with earned endowmentsBarber, BenjaminEnglish, WilliamUltimatum gameNormsEquity theoryInequity aversionEarned endowments53 Ciencias Económicas::5304 Actividad económica::5304.02 DistribuciónODS 10 - Reducción de las desigualdadesWe conduct an ultimatum game with three treatments: one in which endowments are earned through a real effort task (answering spelling questions under time pressure), one in which endowments are awarded through lotteries, and a standard ultimatum game with exogenously provided wealth. When subjects earn the money at stake, the modal response ceases to be an equal split, as proposals anchor around comparative earnings and these proposals are statistically different from those observed in the other treatments. Moreover, roughly half of lower earners propose keeping less than 50% of the pot for themselves. We argue that these results are best explained by Bicchieri’s account of norms and that equity, rather than equality, becomes the dominant norm in ultimatum bargaining when endowments are earned.yesPublishedElsevierhttps://ror.org/02jjdwm75202520252019info:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.008https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3429reponame:Repositorio IEinstname:IEInglésIE Business SchoolIE UniversityStrategyAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationalhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:repositorio.ie.edu:20.500.14417/34292026-06-15T12:40:57Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The origin of wealth matters: Equity norms trump equality norms in the ultimatum game with earned endowments
title The origin of wealth matters: Equity norms trump equality norms in the ultimatum game with earned endowments
spellingShingle The origin of wealth matters: Equity norms trump equality norms in the ultimatum game with earned endowments
Barber, Benjamin
Ultimatum game
Norms
Equity theory
Inequity aversion
Earned endowments
53 Ciencias Económicas::5304 Actividad económica::5304.02 Distribución
ODS 10 - Reducción de las desigualdades
title_short The origin of wealth matters: Equity norms trump equality norms in the ultimatum game with earned endowments
title_full The origin of wealth matters: Equity norms trump equality norms in the ultimatum game with earned endowments
title_fullStr The origin of wealth matters: Equity norms trump equality norms in the ultimatum game with earned endowments
title_full_unstemmed The origin of wealth matters: Equity norms trump equality norms in the ultimatum game with earned endowments
title_sort The origin of wealth matters: Equity norms trump equality norms in the ultimatum game with earned endowments
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Barber, Benjamin
English, William
author Barber, Benjamin
author_facet Barber, Benjamin
English, William
author_role author
author2 English, William
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv https://ror.org/02jjdwm75
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Ultimatum game
Norms
Equity theory
Inequity aversion
Earned endowments
53 Ciencias Económicas::5304 Actividad económica::5304.02 Distribución
ODS 10 - Reducción de las desigualdades
topic Ultimatum game
Norms
Equity theory
Inequity aversion
Earned endowments
53 Ciencias Económicas::5304 Actividad económica::5304.02 Distribución
ODS 10 - Reducción de las desigualdades
description We conduct an ultimatum game with three treatments: one in which endowments are earned through a real effort task (answering spelling questions under time pressure), one in which endowments are awarded through lotteries, and a standard ultimatum game with exogenously provided wealth. When subjects earn the money at stake, the modal response ceases to be an equal split, as proposals anchor around comparative earnings and these proposals are statistically different from those observed in the other treatments. Moreover, roughly half of lower earners propose keeping less than 50% of the pot for themselves. We argue that these results are best explained by Bicchieri’s account of norms and that equity, rather than equality, becomes the dominant norm in ultimatum bargaining when endowments are earned.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019
2025
2025
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.008
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3429
url https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.008
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3429
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv IE Business School
IE University
Strategy
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.en
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.en
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio IE
instname:IE
instname_str IE
reponame_str Repositorio IE
collection Repositorio IE
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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