Political centralization and government accountability

This article explains why decentralization can undermine accountability and answers three questions: what determines if power should be centralized or decentralized when regions are heterogeneous? How many levels of government should there be? How should state borders be drawn? We develop a model of...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Boffa, Federico, Piolatto, Amedeo, Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2016
País:España
Institución:Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Repositorio:Repositorio Digital de la UPF
OAI Identifier:oai:repositori.upf.edu:10230/43258
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10230/43258
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv035
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Descentralització administrativa
Regionalisme
Federalisme
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repository_id_str
spelling Political centralization and government accountabilityBoffa, FedericoPiolatto, AmedeoPonzetto, Giacomo A. M.Descentralització administrativaRegionalismeFederalismeThis article explains why decentralization can undermine accountability and answers three questions: what determines if power should be centralized or decentralized when regions are heterogeneous? How many levels of government should there be? How should state borders be drawn? We develop a model of political agency in which voters differ in their ability to monitor rent-seeking politicians. We find that rent extraction is a decreasing and convex function of the share of informed voters, because voter information improves monitoring but also reduces the appeal of holding office. As a result, information heterogeneity pushes toward centralization to reduce rent extraction. Taste heterogeneity pulls instead toward decentralization to match local preferences. Our model thus implies that optimal borders should cluster by tastes but ensure diversity of information. We also find economies of scope in accountability that explain why multiplying government tiers harms efficiency. A single government in charge of many policies has better incentives than many special-purpose governments splitting its budget and responsibilities. Hence, a federal system is desirable only if information varies enough across regions.Boffa acknowledges financial support from the Free University of Bolzano (WW82); Piolatto from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO-2012-37131) and the Government of Catalonia (2014-SGR-420); Ponzetto from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (JCI-2010-08414 and ECO-2011-25624), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (RYC-2013-13838), the Government of Catalonia (2009-SGR-1157 and 2014-SGR-830), the Barcelona GSE and the BBVA Foundation through its first grant for Researchers, Innovators and Cultural Creators.Oxford University Press202020202016info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10230/43258http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv035reponame:Repositorio Digital de la UPFinstname:Universitat Pompeu FabraInglésThe Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2016 Feb;131(1):381-422info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/3PN/ECO-2012-37131info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/3PN/ECO-2011-25624info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/RYC-2013-13838info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/3PN/JCI-2010-08414© Oxford University Press. This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Quarterly Journal of Economics following peer review. The version of record Boffa F, Piolatto A, Ponzetto GAM. Political centralization and government accountability. Q J Econ. 2016;131(1):381-422 is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv035info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:repositori.upf.edu:10230/432582026-06-12T07:21:37Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Political centralization and government accountability
title Political centralization and government accountability
spellingShingle Political centralization and government accountability
Boffa, Federico
Descentralització administrativa
Regionalisme
Federalisme
title_short Political centralization and government accountability
title_full Political centralization and government accountability
title_fullStr Political centralization and government accountability
title_full_unstemmed Political centralization and government accountability
title_sort Political centralization and government accountability
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Boffa, Federico
Piolatto, Amedeo
Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
author Boffa, Federico
author_facet Boffa, Federico
Piolatto, Amedeo
Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
author_role author
author2 Piolatto, Amedeo
Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Descentralització administrativa
Regionalisme
Federalisme
topic Descentralització administrativa
Regionalisme
Federalisme
description This article explains why decentralization can undermine accountability and answers three questions: what determines if power should be centralized or decentralized when regions are heterogeneous? How many levels of government should there be? How should state borders be drawn? We develop a model of political agency in which voters differ in their ability to monitor rent-seeking politicians. We find that rent extraction is a decreasing and convex function of the share of informed voters, because voter information improves monitoring but also reduces the appeal of holding office. As a result, information heterogeneity pushes toward centralization to reduce rent extraction. Taste heterogeneity pulls instead toward decentralization to match local preferences. Our model thus implies that optimal borders should cluster by tastes but ensure diversity of information. We also find economies of scope in accountability that explain why multiplying government tiers harms efficiency. A single government in charge of many policies has better incentives than many special-purpose governments splitting its budget and responsibilities. Hence, a federal system is desirable only if information varies enough across regions.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016
2020
2020
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10230/43258
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv035
url http://hdl.handle.net/10230/43258
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv035
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2016 Feb;131(1):381-422
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/3PN/ECO-2012-37131
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/3PN/ECO-2011-25624
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/RYC-2013-13838
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/3PN/JCI-2010-08414
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Oxford University Press
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Oxford University Press
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio Digital de la UPF
instname:Universitat Pompeu Fabra
instname_str Universitat Pompeu Fabra
reponame_str Repositorio Digital de la UPF
collection Repositorio Digital de la UPF
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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