El problema de la deducción de una obligación. El deber para la teoría y la práctica
Kant has been the only author who has attempted a deduction of ethical and legal obligations. He namely tried to deduce the ought from the free will. The fact that he finally resorted to the fact of reason proves that he did not succeed in the former deduction. In order to do so, he should have foun...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2004 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Navarra |
| Repositorio: | Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:dadun.unav.edu:10171/4575 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10171/4575 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Deberes Kant, Immanuel Obligaciones |
| Sumario: | Kant has been the only author who has attempted a deduction of ethical and legal obligations. He namely tried to deduce the ought from the free will. The fact that he finally resorted to the fact of reason proves that he did not succeed in the former deduction. In order to do so, he should have found an additional ground to add to the free will, for the relationship between morality and free will cannot be analytic. It is argued that the addition of such a ground would have not invalidated the argument, neither does it involve any naturalistic fallacy, since the free will is not a natural fact, but rather something intentional. The article shows how far Kant would have gone had he reflected further upon the intentional character of the will. |
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