How Judges Can Challenge Dictators and Get Away with It: Advancing Democracy while Preserving Judicial Independence

The literature on constitutional courts in authoritarian and hybrid regimes typically suggests that judges who challenge such regimes in high-stakes cases risk substantial political backlash. Accordingly, some comparative constitutional law scholars argue that courts should develop strategies such a...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Verdugo, Sergio
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2020
País:España
Institución:IE
Repositorio:Repositorio IE
OAI Identifier:oai:repositorio.ie.edu:20.500.14417/4141
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/4141
https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/volume-59/how-judges-can-challenge-dictators-and-get-away-with-it-advancing-democracy-while-preserving-judicial-independence
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:59 Ciencia Política::5906 Sociología política
ODS 16 - Paz, justicia e instituciones sólidas
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spelling How Judges Can Challenge Dictators and Get Away with It: Advancing Democracy while Preserving Judicial IndependenceVerdugo, Sergio59 Ciencia Política::5906 Sociología políticaODS 16 - Paz, justicia e instituciones sólidasThe literature on constitutional courts in authoritarian and hybrid regimes typically suggests that judges who challenge such regimes in high-stakes cases risk substantial political backlash. Accordingly, some comparative constitutional law scholars argue that courts should develop strategies such as judicial avoidance or weak judicial review practices to prevent a clash with the governing regime. This Article proposes an alternative, suggesting that those strategies are unnecessary where courts are able to preserve or promote democratic values without incurring backlash. Where feasible, judges should prefer this case-specific confrontational tactic to survival strategies, such as weak judicial review or constitutional avoidance. To succeed, judges must identify and predict the regime’s expected costs of disobeying a judicial decision. If the projected costs are high enough, the regime’s leaders might prefer to comply with the ruling. One way in which this judicial strategy can work is by triggering a constitutional paradox. This term describes the dilemma dictators face when they are forced to decide whether to support the constitutionally-rooted institutions they themselves have established, or to disobey the unfavorable decision while risking to divide the regime’s supporting coalition, harm their own credibility, or weaken the legitimacy or authority of their regime’s institutions. As a tool of judicial statecraft, the well-crafted paradox raises the costs to the regime of ignoring any single judicial decision, and those costs may be sufficiently high to pressure autocrats into acquiescence. This Article uses the Chilean Constitutional Court during the Pinochet Dictatorship (1973–1990) to show how the constitutional paradox can push dictators to respect adverse judicial rulings in high-stakes scenarios, and to identify the preliminary conditions in which judges may be able to successfully deploy this strategy against the regime.YesPublishedColumbia Universityhttps://ror.org/02jjdwm7520262020info:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/4141https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/volume-59/how-judges-can-challenge-dictators-and-get-away-with-it-advancing-democracy-while-preserving-judicial-independencereponame:Repositorio IEinstname:IEInglésIE Law SchoolIE UniversityPublic Law & Global GovernanceAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:repositorio.ie.edu:20.500.14417/41412026-06-15T12:40:57Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv How Judges Can Challenge Dictators and Get Away with It: Advancing Democracy while Preserving Judicial Independence
title How Judges Can Challenge Dictators and Get Away with It: Advancing Democracy while Preserving Judicial Independence
spellingShingle How Judges Can Challenge Dictators and Get Away with It: Advancing Democracy while Preserving Judicial Independence
Verdugo, Sergio
59 Ciencia Política::5906 Sociología política
ODS 16 - Paz, justicia e instituciones sólidas
title_short How Judges Can Challenge Dictators and Get Away with It: Advancing Democracy while Preserving Judicial Independence
title_full How Judges Can Challenge Dictators and Get Away with It: Advancing Democracy while Preserving Judicial Independence
title_fullStr How Judges Can Challenge Dictators and Get Away with It: Advancing Democracy while Preserving Judicial Independence
title_full_unstemmed How Judges Can Challenge Dictators and Get Away with It: Advancing Democracy while Preserving Judicial Independence
title_sort How Judges Can Challenge Dictators and Get Away with It: Advancing Democracy while Preserving Judicial Independence
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Verdugo, Sergio
author Verdugo, Sergio
author_facet Verdugo, Sergio
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv https://ror.org/02jjdwm75
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv 59 Ciencia Política::5906 Sociología política
ODS 16 - Paz, justicia e instituciones sólidas
topic 59 Ciencia Política::5906 Sociología política
ODS 16 - Paz, justicia e instituciones sólidas
description The literature on constitutional courts in authoritarian and hybrid regimes typically suggests that judges who challenge such regimes in high-stakes cases risk substantial political backlash. Accordingly, some comparative constitutional law scholars argue that courts should develop strategies such as judicial avoidance or weak judicial review practices to prevent a clash with the governing regime. This Article proposes an alternative, suggesting that those strategies are unnecessary where courts are able to preserve or promote democratic values without incurring backlash. Where feasible, judges should prefer this case-specific confrontational tactic to survival strategies, such as weak judicial review or constitutional avoidance. To succeed, judges must identify and predict the regime’s expected costs of disobeying a judicial decision. If the projected costs are high enough, the regime’s leaders might prefer to comply with the ruling. One way in which this judicial strategy can work is by triggering a constitutional paradox. This term describes the dilemma dictators face when they are forced to decide whether to support the constitutionally-rooted institutions they themselves have established, or to disobey the unfavorable decision while risking to divide the regime’s supporting coalition, harm their own credibility, or weaken the legitimacy or authority of their regime’s institutions. As a tool of judicial statecraft, the well-crafted paradox raises the costs to the regime of ignoring any single judicial decision, and those costs may be sufficiently high to pressure autocrats into acquiescence. This Article uses the Chilean Constitutional Court during the Pinochet Dictatorship (1973–1990) to show how the constitutional paradox can push dictators to respect adverse judicial rulings in high-stakes scenarios, and to identify the preliminary conditions in which judges may be able to successfully deploy this strategy against the regime.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2020
2026
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/4141
https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/volume-59/how-judges-can-challenge-dictators-and-get-away-with-it-advancing-democracy-while-preserving-judicial-independence
url https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/4141
https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/volume-59/how-judges-can-challenge-dictators-and-get-away-with-it-advancing-democracy-while-preserving-judicial-independence
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv IE Law School
IE University
Public Law & Global Governance
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Columbia University
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Columbia University
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio IE
instname:IE
instname_str IE
reponame_str Repositorio IE
collection Repositorio IE
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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