Group Assertions and Group Lies

[eng] Groups, like individuals, can communicate. They can issue statements, make promises, give advice. Sometimes, in doing so, they lie and deceive. The goal of this paper is to ofer a precise characterisation of what it means for a group to make an assertion and to lie. I begin by showing that Lac...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Marsili, Neri
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2023
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
OAI Identifier:oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/216478
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/216478
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Representació del coneixement (Teoria de la informació)
Justificació (Teoria del coneixement)
Negació (Lògica)
Knowledge representation (Information theory)
Justification (Theory of Knowledge)
Negation (Logic)
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spelling Group Assertions and Group LiesMarsili, NeriRepresentació del coneixement (Teoria de la informació)Justificació (Teoria del coneixement)Negació (Lògica)Knowledge representation (Information theory)Justification (Theory of Knowledge)Negation (Logic)[eng] Groups, like individuals, can communicate. They can issue statements, make promises, give advice. Sometimes, in doing so, they lie and deceive. The goal of this paper is to ofer a precise characterisation of what it means for a group to make an assertion and to lie. I begin by showing that Lackey’s infuential account of group assertion is unable to distinguish assertions from other speech acts, explicit statements from implicatures, and lying from misleading. I propose an alternative view, according to which a group asserts a proposition only if it explicitly presents that proposition as true, thereby committing to its truth. This proposal is then put to work to defne group lying. While scholars typically assume that group lying requires (i) a deceptive intent and (ii) a belief in the falsity of the asserted proposition, I ofer a defnition that drops condition (i) and signifcantly broadens condition (ii).Springer Science + Business Media2023info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/216478Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UBinstname:Universidad de BarcelonaInglésReproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-022-09875-1Topoi. An International Review of Philosophy, 2023, vol. 42, num.2, p. 369-384https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-022-09875-1cc-by (c) Marsili, Neri, 2023http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/2164782026-05-27T06:46:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Group Assertions and Group Lies
title Group Assertions and Group Lies
spellingShingle Group Assertions and Group Lies
Marsili, Neri
Representació del coneixement (Teoria de la informació)
Justificació (Teoria del coneixement)
Negació (Lògica)
Knowledge representation (Information theory)
Justification (Theory of Knowledge)
Negation (Logic)
title_short Group Assertions and Group Lies
title_full Group Assertions and Group Lies
title_fullStr Group Assertions and Group Lies
title_full_unstemmed Group Assertions and Group Lies
title_sort Group Assertions and Group Lies
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Marsili, Neri
author Marsili, Neri
author_facet Marsili, Neri
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Representació del coneixement (Teoria de la informació)
Justificació (Teoria del coneixement)
Negació (Lògica)
Knowledge representation (Information theory)
Justification (Theory of Knowledge)
Negation (Logic)
topic Representació del coneixement (Teoria de la informació)
Justificació (Teoria del coneixement)
Negació (Lògica)
Knowledge representation (Information theory)
Justification (Theory of Knowledge)
Negation (Logic)
description [eng] Groups, like individuals, can communicate. They can issue statements, make promises, give advice. Sometimes, in doing so, they lie and deceive. The goal of this paper is to ofer a precise characterisation of what it means for a group to make an assertion and to lie. I begin by showing that Lackey’s infuential account of group assertion is unable to distinguish assertions from other speech acts, explicit statements from implicatures, and lying from misleading. I propose an alternative view, according to which a group asserts a proposition only if it explicitly presents that proposition as true, thereby committing to its truth. This proposal is then put to work to defne group lying. While scholars typically assume that group lying requires (i) a deceptive intent and (ii) a belief in the falsity of the asserted proposition, I ofer a defnition that drops condition (i) and signifcantly broadens condition (ii).
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/216478
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/216478
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-022-09875-1
Topoi. An International Review of Philosophy, 2023, vol. 42, num.2, p. 369-384
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-022-09875-1
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv cc-by (c) Marsili, Neri, 2023
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv cc-by (c) Marsili, Neri, 2023
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer Science + Business Media
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer Science + Business Media
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
instname:Universidad de Barcelona
instname_str Universidad de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de la UB
collection Dipòsit Digital de la UB
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15,812429

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