Short and Long Run Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability and Prosecution

This study investigates the effects of leniency programs on cartel duration, cartel fines, and the length of investigations, providing empirical insights that contribute to the ongoing debate regarding their theoretical and empirical implications. The introduction of leniency programs in two differe...

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Autores: Borrell, Joan-Ramon, García Galindo, Carmen, Jiménez González, Juan Luis, Ordóñez de Haro, José Manuel
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2024
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
OAI Identifier:oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/221790
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/221790
Access Level:acceso embargado
Palabra clave:Competència econòmica
Càrtels
Condonació del deute
Competition
Cartels
Debt relief
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spelling Short and Long Run Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability and ProsecutionBorrell, Joan-RamonGarcía Galindo, CarmenJiménez González, Juan LuisOrdóñez de Haro, José ManuelCompetència econòmicaCàrtelsCondonació del deuteCompetitionCartelsDebt reliefThis study investigates the effects of leniency programs on cartel duration, cartel fines, and the length of investigations, providing empirical insights that contribute to the ongoing debate regarding their theoretical and empirical implications. The introduction of leniency programs in two different jurisdictions (EU and Spain) at different times and the exogeneity of the introduction date enable us to identify their impact using difference-in-differences estimations. We empirically show that leniency programs, by destabilizing existing cartels, allow for the detection of the longer-lasting ones in the short run. In the long run, our results suggest that destabilization effects prevail, and leniency programs discourage the creation of new cartels. Specifically, our findings indicate that the duration of detected cartels almost doubles in the short run and nearly halves in the long run. Finally, our study reveals that the introduction of leniency programs results in a significant increase in the average fines per cartel case, both before and after taking into account the fine reductions resulting from these programs. This suggests that leniency programs contribute to stronger sanctions against cartels, enhancing their general deterrent effect. However, our findings also indicate that leniency programs lengthen the average duration of cartel investigations, which may hinder the ability of competition authorities to proactively pursue other cases.Oxford University Press2024info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/221790Articles publicats en revistes (Econometria, Estadística i Economia Aplicada)reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UBinstname:Universidad de BarcelonaInglésVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhae007Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 2024, vol. 20, num.3, p. 181-205https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhae007(c) Borrell, J.R. et al., 2024info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccessoai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/2217902026-05-27T06:46:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Short and Long Run Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability and Prosecution
title Short and Long Run Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability and Prosecution
spellingShingle Short and Long Run Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability and Prosecution
Borrell, Joan-Ramon
Competència econòmica
Càrtels
Condonació del deute
Competition
Cartels
Debt relief
title_short Short and Long Run Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability and Prosecution
title_full Short and Long Run Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability and Prosecution
title_fullStr Short and Long Run Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability and Prosecution
title_full_unstemmed Short and Long Run Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability and Prosecution
title_sort Short and Long Run Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability and Prosecution
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Borrell, Joan-Ramon
García Galindo, Carmen
Jiménez González, Juan Luis
Ordóñez de Haro, José Manuel
author Borrell, Joan-Ramon
author_facet Borrell, Joan-Ramon
García Galindo, Carmen
Jiménez González, Juan Luis
Ordóñez de Haro, José Manuel
author_role author
author2 García Galindo, Carmen
Jiménez González, Juan Luis
Ordóñez de Haro, José Manuel
author2_role author
author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Competència econòmica
Càrtels
Condonació del deute
Competition
Cartels
Debt relief
topic Competència econòmica
Càrtels
Condonació del deute
Competition
Cartels
Debt relief
description This study investigates the effects of leniency programs on cartel duration, cartel fines, and the length of investigations, providing empirical insights that contribute to the ongoing debate regarding their theoretical and empirical implications. The introduction of leniency programs in two different jurisdictions (EU and Spain) at different times and the exogeneity of the introduction date enable us to identify their impact using difference-in-differences estimations. We empirically show that leniency programs, by destabilizing existing cartels, allow for the detection of the longer-lasting ones in the short run. In the long run, our results suggest that destabilization effects prevail, and leniency programs discourage the creation of new cartels. Specifically, our findings indicate that the duration of detected cartels almost doubles in the short run and nearly halves in the long run. Finally, our study reveals that the introduction of leniency programs results in a significant increase in the average fines per cartel case, both before and after taking into account the fine reductions resulting from these programs. This suggests that leniency programs contribute to stronger sanctions against cartels, enhancing their general deterrent effect. However, our findings also indicate that leniency programs lengthen the average duration of cartel investigations, which may hinder the ability of competition authorities to proactively pursue other cases.
publishDate 2024
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2024
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/221790
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/221790
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhae007
Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 2024, vol. 20, num.3, p. 181-205
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhae007
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv (c) Borrell, J.R. et al., 2024
info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv (c) Borrell, J.R. et al., 2024
eu_rights_str_mv embargoedAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Oxford University Press
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Oxford University Press
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Econometria, Estadística i Economia Aplicada)
reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
instname:Universidad de Barcelona
instname_str Universidad de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de la UB
collection Dipòsit Digital de la UB
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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