On the Public and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods
[EN] We extend Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian’s (1986) model to a non-cooperative approach where voluntary contributions and taxes coexist to finance public goods. After obtaining the uniqueness of equilibrium, we present different properties of the outcomes, showing the role that the taxes play and t...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2025 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Salamanca (USAL) |
| Repositorio: | GREDOS. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Salamanca |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:gredos.usal.es:10366/168859 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10366/168859 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Public goods Taxes Neutrality Private provision Voluntary contributions Welfare 5506.06 Historia de la Economía |
| Sumario: | [EN] We extend Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian’s (1986) model to a non-cooperative approach where voluntary contributions and taxes coexist to finance public goods. After obtaining the uniqueness of equilibrium, we present different properties of the outcomes, showing the role that the taxes play and the impact on voluntary contributions. We also identify conditions ensuring neutrality. Finally, we present some remarks on welfare and efficiency, pointing out the second-best solution and identifying conditions for efficiency. |
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