Second-order economic voting in elections to the European Parliament
When examining citizens' behaviour in elections to the European Parliament (EP), second order elections (SOE) and economic voting (EV) have overlooked each other as alien traditions. However, they should not be seen as incompatible: voters may use EP elections to support national incumbents but...
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| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Data de publicação: | 2024 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| Repositório: | Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ddd.uab.cat:290821 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://ddd.uab.cat/record/290821 https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.5565/rev/papers.3159 |
| Access Level: | Acceso aberto |
| Palavra-chave: | European elections Second-order elections Economic voting Accountability Eleccions europees Eleccions de segon ordre Vot econòmic Rendició de comptes Elecciones europeas Elecciones de segundo orden Voto económico Rendición de cuentas |
| Resumo: | When examining citizens' behaviour in elections to the European Parliament (EP), second order elections (SOE) and economic voting (EV) have overlooked each other as alien traditions. However, they should not be seen as incompatible: voters may use EP elections to support national incumbents but, at the same time, this support may be the result of an economic assessment. This paper blends both frameworks and finds that, even though EP elections are not intended to evaluate domestic politics, voters use them to reward or punish national incumbents (i.e. SOE) for the state of the economy (i.e. EV); a behaviour referred to here as 'second-order economic voting'. The predominance of second-order EV is relevant for EU politics. If EP elections enhance national incumbents' accountability while the European executive remains unacknowledged, this could be disturbing for European economic institutions. |
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