La interpretación de los derechos fundamentales por parte del Tribunal Constitucional
This article deals with one of the mayor issues in legal philosophy, that is to say the interpretation of the law, and more precisely, the interpretation of rules of human rights contained in the Spanish Constitution. There are two central questions which are connected: The first is why it is necess...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2006 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad Rey Juan Carlos |
| Repositorio: | BURJC-Digital. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Rey Juan Carlos |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:burjcdigital.urjc.es:10115/3351 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10115/3351 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Derecho 5605.04 Derecho Constitucional |
| Sumario: | This article deals with one of the mayor issues in legal philosophy, that is to say the interpretation of the law, and more precisely, the interpretation of rules of human rights contained in the Spanish Constitution. There are two central questions which are connected: The first is why it is necessary to interpret the rules of human rights and the second is how to interpret those rules so that the result will lead to the main purpose of the legal reasoning: to search for a just solution. My thesis is that legal interpretation of human rights includes far more than a pure and mechanical application of norms or principles in a given social situation. It implies a reasonable argumentation made from the balancing of the rules containing rights ¿understood as principles- in conflict so that the interpreter is sure that no injustice results from his proceedings. The main reasons for understanding interpretative legal reasoning in such a way are respect for authority and value continuity, specially the first. In this sense the influence of Analytical Jurisprudence on the issue of Human Rights and rights in general is clearly visible. Many studies on rights are influenced by or directly formed by means of analytical patterns of thought, as is the case in the approaches of J. RAZ. |
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