An axiomatization for two power indices for (3,2)-simple games

Electronic version of an article published as International Game Theory Review, Vol. 21, Issue 1, 1940001, 2019, p. 1-24. DOI: 10.1142/S0219198919400012] © World Scientific Publishing Company https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/10.1142/S0219198919400012

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autores: Bernardi, Giulia, Freixas Bosch, Josep|||0000-0002-9033-9432
Formato: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2019
País:España
Recursos:Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC)
Repositorio:UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:upcommons.upc.edu:2117/133317
Acesso em linha:https://hdl.handle.net/2117/133317
https://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0219198919400012
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:Game theory
Voting -- Mathematical models
Voting -- Abstention
Games with abstention
Power indices
Axioms
Voting
Jocs, Teoria de
Vot -- Models matemàtics
Abstencionisme electoral
Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory
Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs
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spelling An axiomatization for two power indices for (3,2)-simple gamesBernardi, GiuliaFreixas Bosch, Josep|||0000-0002-9033-9432Game theoryVoting -- Mathematical modelsVoting -- AbstentionGames with abstentionPower indicesAxiomsVotingJocs, Teoria deVot -- Models matemàticsAbstencionisme electoralClassificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theoryÀrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocsElectronic version of an article published as International Game Theory Review, Vol. 21, Issue 1, 1940001, 2019, p. 1-24. DOI: 10.1142/S0219198919400012] © World Scientific Publishing Company https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/10.1142/S0219198919400012The aim of this work is to give a characterization of the Shapley–Shubik and the Banzhaf power indices for (3,2)-simple games. We generalize to the set of (3,2)-simple games the classical axioms for power indices on simple games: transfer, anonymity, null player property and efficiency. However, these four axioms are not enough to uniquely characterize the Shapley–Shubik index for (3,2)-simple games. Thus, we introduce a new axiom to prove the uniqueness of the extension of the Shapley–Shubik power index in this context. Moreover, we provide an analogous characterization for the Banzhaf index for (3,2)-simple games, generalizing the four axioms for simple games and adding another property.Peer Reviewed20192019-01-0120192019-05-22journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501AMhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aainfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2117/133317https://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0219198919400012reponame:UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPCinstname:Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC)InglésengMinisterio de Economía y Competitividad http://doi.org/10.13039/501100003329 MTM2015-66818-P ASPECTOS MATEMATICOS, COMPUTACIONALES Y SOCIALES EN CONTEXTOS DE VOTACION Y DE COOPERACION.open accesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spainhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:upcommons.upc.edu:2117/1333172026-05-27T15:37:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv An axiomatization for two power indices for (3,2)-simple games
title An axiomatization for two power indices for (3,2)-simple games
spellingShingle An axiomatization for two power indices for (3,2)-simple games
Bernardi, Giulia
Game theory
Voting -- Mathematical models
Voting -- Abstention
Games with abstention
Power indices
Axioms
Voting
Jocs, Teoria de
Vot -- Models matemàtics
Abstencionisme electoral
Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory
Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs
title_short An axiomatization for two power indices for (3,2)-simple games
title_full An axiomatization for two power indices for (3,2)-simple games
title_fullStr An axiomatization for two power indices for (3,2)-simple games
title_full_unstemmed An axiomatization for two power indices for (3,2)-simple games
title_sort An axiomatization for two power indices for (3,2)-simple games
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Bernardi, Giulia
Freixas Bosch, Josep|||0000-0002-9033-9432
author Bernardi, Giulia
author_facet Bernardi, Giulia
Freixas Bosch, Josep|||0000-0002-9033-9432
author_role author
author2 Freixas Bosch, Josep|||0000-0002-9033-9432
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Game theory
Voting -- Mathematical models
Voting -- Abstention
Games with abstention
Power indices
Axioms
Voting
Jocs, Teoria de
Vot -- Models matemàtics
Abstencionisme electoral
Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory
Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs
topic Game theory
Voting -- Mathematical models
Voting -- Abstention
Games with abstention
Power indices
Axioms
Voting
Jocs, Teoria de
Vot -- Models matemàtics
Abstencionisme electoral
Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory
Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs
description Electronic version of an article published as International Game Theory Review, Vol. 21, Issue 1, 1940001, 2019, p. 1-24. DOI: 10.1142/S0219198919400012] © World Scientific Publishing Company https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/10.1142/S0219198919400012
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019
2019-01-01
2019
2019-05-22
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv journal article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
AM
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa
dc.type.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2117/133317
https://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0219198919400012
url https://hdl.handle.net/2117/133317
https://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0219198919400012
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
eng
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad http://doi.org/10.13039/501100003329 MTM2015-66818-P ASPECTOS MATEMATICOS, COMPUTACIONALES Y SOCIALES EN CONTEXTOS DE VOTACION Y DE COOPERACION.
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spain
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.rights.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spain
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
instname:Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC)
instname_str Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC)
reponame_str UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
collection UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15,198674

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