Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games
We show that on the domain of convex games, Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution is characterized by core selection, aggregate monotonicity, and bounded richness, a new property requiring that the poorest players cannot be made richer within the core. Replacing 'poorest' by 'poorer&#...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2021 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/186271 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/186271 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Axiomes Funcions convexes Igualtat Axioms Convex functions Equality |
| Sumario: | We show that on the domain of convex games, Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution is characterized by core selection, aggregate monotonicity, and bounded richness, a new property requiring that the poorest players cannot be made richer within the core. Replacing 'poorest' by 'poorer' allows to eliminate aggregate monotonicity. Moreover, we show that the egalitarian solution is characterized by constrained welfare egalitarianism and either bilateral consistency à la Davis and Maschler or, together with individual rationality, by bilateral consistency à la Hart and Mas-Colell. |
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