Voting to persuade

We consider a model of collective persuasion, in which members of an advisory committee with private continuous signals vote on a policy change. A decision maker then decides whether to adopt the change upon observing each vote. Information transmission between the committee and the decision maker i...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Wong, Tsz-Ning, Yang, Lily Ling, Zhao, Xin
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2024
País:España
Institución:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repositorio:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:2445/220224
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/220224
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Sociologia electoral
Comitès
Vot
Persuasió (Retòrica)
Voting research
Committees
Voting
Persuasion (Rhetoric)
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spelling Voting to persuadeWong, Tsz-NingYang, Lily LingZhao, XinSociologia electoralComitèsVotPersuasió (Retòrica)Voting researchCommitteesVotingPersuasion (Rhetoric)We consider a model of collective persuasion, in which members of an advisory committee with private continuous signals vote on a policy change. A decision maker then decides whether to adopt the change upon observing each vote. Information transmission between the committee and the decision maker is possible if and only if there exists an informative equilibrium in which the decision maker only adopts the policy change after a unanimous vote. Similarly, full information aggregation is achievable if and only if such an equilibrium exists when the size of the committee is large enough. We further discuss why our continuous-signal model produces results different from discrete-signal models.Elsevier2025202520242025info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion9 p.application/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/220224Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunyainstname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)InglésReproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.007Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, vol. 145, p. 208-216https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.007cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier, 2024http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:recercat.cat:2445/2202242026-05-29T05:05:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Voting to persuade
title Voting to persuade
spellingShingle Voting to persuade
Wong, Tsz-Ning
Sociologia electoral
Comitès
Vot
Persuasió (Retòrica)
Voting research
Committees
Voting
Persuasion (Rhetoric)
title_short Voting to persuade
title_full Voting to persuade
title_fullStr Voting to persuade
title_full_unstemmed Voting to persuade
title_sort Voting to persuade
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Wong, Tsz-Ning
Yang, Lily Ling
Zhao, Xin
author Wong, Tsz-Ning
author_facet Wong, Tsz-Ning
Yang, Lily Ling
Zhao, Xin
author_role author
author2 Yang, Lily Ling
Zhao, Xin
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Sociologia electoral
Comitès
Vot
Persuasió (Retòrica)
Voting research
Committees
Voting
Persuasion (Rhetoric)
topic Sociologia electoral
Comitès
Vot
Persuasió (Retòrica)
Voting research
Committees
Voting
Persuasion (Rhetoric)
description We consider a model of collective persuasion, in which members of an advisory committee with private continuous signals vote on a policy change. A decision maker then decides whether to adopt the change upon observing each vote. Information transmission between the committee and the decision maker is possible if and only if there exists an informative equilibrium in which the decision maker only adopts the policy change after a unanimous vote. Similarly, full information aggregation is achievable if and only if such an equilibrium exists when the size of the committee is large enough. We further discuss why our continuous-signal model produces results different from discrete-signal models.
publishDate 2024
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2024
2025
2025
2025
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/220224
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/220224
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.007
Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, vol. 145, p. 208-216
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.007
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier, 2024
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier, 2024
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv 9 p.
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)
reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
instname_str Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
reponame_str Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
collection Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15,81155

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