Central Bank independence: Taylor rule and fiscal policy
In this article we will show that independence is not enough to impose a given inflation target when the Central Bank is following a Taylor rule, moreover in such a case, the fiscal authority will be able to set a different objective from the one sought by the monetary authority. On the other hand,...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | informe técnico |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2004 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM) |
| Repositorio: | Docta Complutense |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/56545 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/56545 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Banco Central Reglas de Taylor Dinero 5304.06 Dinero y Operaciones Bancarias |
| Sumario: | In this article we will show that independence is not enough to impose a given inflation target when the Central Bank is following a Taylor rule, moreover in such a case, the fiscal authority will be able to set a different objective from the one sought by the monetary authority. On the other hand, if the fiscal authority is acting in accordance with a rule in which there is a estimated equilibrium expenditure G* similar to the estimated real interest rate r* in the Taylor rule, neither the government will be able to establish its inflation target value. In this sense, the type of rule that the economic authorities implement is essential for stabilization purposes. The different periods of implementation in fiscal and monetary policy are taken into account although they did not change the main conclusions. |
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