Nonconceptualism and the Cognitive Impenetrability of Early Vision

This paper examines the relationship between cognitive impenetrability and perceptual nonconceptualism. I argue against the view, recently defended by Raftopoulos, that the (alleged) cognitive impenetrability of early vision is a necessary and sufficient condition for states of early vision and thei...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Toribio Mateas, Josefa
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2014
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
OAI Identifier:oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/161922
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/161922
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Teoria del coneixement
Filosofia de la ment
Percepció
Cognició
Theory of knowledge
Philosophy of mind
Perception
Cognition
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spelling Nonconceptualism and the Cognitive Impenetrability of Early VisionToribio Mateas, JosefaTeoria del coneixementFilosofia de la mentPercepcióCognicióTheory of knowledgePhilosophy of mindPerceptionCognitionThis paper examines the relationship between cognitive impenetrability and perceptual nonconceptualism. I argue against the view, recently defended by Raftopoulos, that the (alleged) cognitive impenetrability of early vision is a necessary and sufficient condition for states of early vision and their content to be nonconceptual. I show that that view, here dubbed 'the mutually entailing thesis', admits two different standard interpretations depending on how we understand the property of being nonconceptual corresponding to the distinction between the state and the content views of perceptual nonconceptualism. I first argue for the falsity of the state-nonconceptualist reading of the mutually entailing thesis, on the grounds that it mistakenly takes being nonconceptual to be a causal instead of a constitutive relationship. The content-nonconceptualist understanding of the thesis, I then argue, is disproved by plausible views regarding the content of experience. The mutually entailing thesis could only be true, I conclude, on a non-standard, causal interpretation of the notion of nonconceptual content. Yet, on that reading, the thesis would either be trivially true or would entirely fail to engage with the contemporary literature on perceptual nonconceptualism.Taylor and Francis2014info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/161922Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UBinstname:Universidad de BarcelonaInglésVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2014.893386Philosophical Psychology, 2014, vol. 27, num. 5, p. 621-642https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2014.893386(c) Taylor and Francis, 2014info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/1619222026-05-27T06:46:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Nonconceptualism and the Cognitive Impenetrability of Early Vision
title Nonconceptualism and the Cognitive Impenetrability of Early Vision
spellingShingle Nonconceptualism and the Cognitive Impenetrability of Early Vision
Toribio Mateas, Josefa
Teoria del coneixement
Filosofia de la ment
Percepció
Cognició
Theory of knowledge
Philosophy of mind
Perception
Cognition
title_short Nonconceptualism and the Cognitive Impenetrability of Early Vision
title_full Nonconceptualism and the Cognitive Impenetrability of Early Vision
title_fullStr Nonconceptualism and the Cognitive Impenetrability of Early Vision
title_full_unstemmed Nonconceptualism and the Cognitive Impenetrability of Early Vision
title_sort Nonconceptualism and the Cognitive Impenetrability of Early Vision
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Toribio Mateas, Josefa
author Toribio Mateas, Josefa
author_facet Toribio Mateas, Josefa
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Teoria del coneixement
Filosofia de la ment
Percepció
Cognició
Theory of knowledge
Philosophy of mind
Perception
Cognition
topic Teoria del coneixement
Filosofia de la ment
Percepció
Cognició
Theory of knowledge
Philosophy of mind
Perception
Cognition
description This paper examines the relationship between cognitive impenetrability and perceptual nonconceptualism. I argue against the view, recently defended by Raftopoulos, that the (alleged) cognitive impenetrability of early vision is a necessary and sufficient condition for states of early vision and their content to be nonconceptual. I show that that view, here dubbed 'the mutually entailing thesis', admits two different standard interpretations depending on how we understand the property of being nonconceptual corresponding to the distinction between the state and the content views of perceptual nonconceptualism. I first argue for the falsity of the state-nonconceptualist reading of the mutually entailing thesis, on the grounds that it mistakenly takes being nonconceptual to be a causal instead of a constitutive relationship. The content-nonconceptualist understanding of the thesis, I then argue, is disproved by plausible views regarding the content of experience. The mutually entailing thesis could only be true, I conclude, on a non-standard, causal interpretation of the notion of nonconceptual content. Yet, on that reading, the thesis would either be trivially true or would entirely fail to engage with the contemporary literature on perceptual nonconceptualism.
publishDate 2014
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2014
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/161922
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/161922
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2014.893386
Philosophical Psychology, 2014, vol. 27, num. 5, p. 621-642
https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2014.893386
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv (c) Taylor and Francis, 2014
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv (c) Taylor and Francis, 2014
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Taylor and Francis
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Taylor and Francis
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
instname:Universidad de Barcelona
instname_str Universidad de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de la UB
collection Dipòsit Digital de la UB
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15.301603

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