Animal disability and biotechnological interventions
The overlaps between disability studies and animal studies have extensively been explored in the literature, although not without controversy. Most recently, disability theorist Sunaura Taylor has claimed that all nonhuman animals can be considered crips, since what it means to be able is determined...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2020 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM) |
| Repositorio: | Docta Complutense |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/101497 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/101497 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | 17 Discapacidad Ética 71 Ética |
| Sumario: | The overlaps between disability studies and animal studies have extensively been explored in the literature, although not without controversy. Most recently, disability theorist Sunaura Taylor has claimed that all nonhuman animals can be considered crips, since what it means to be able is determined by species-specific neurotypical human standards. Here, while fully endorsing Taylor’s position, I will claim that even though all nonhuman animals are crips in this sense, some are more crips than others. Namely, nonhuman animals with physical disabilities living in the wild. Such increased vulnerability entails that wild animals are worse off and that their disadvantageous situation imposes strong ethical demands on us. Next, I will claim that one way to comply with such demands is to extend prosthetic devices, which are increasingly being applied to companion animals, to wild animals in similar condition. Finally, I will claim that opposition to these and other biotechnological interventions on the basis of their being infeasible or against nature are ultimately ungrounded. |
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