The strong versions of embodied cognition: three challenges faced.
The aim of this article is to discuss three challenges to the so-called “strong” versions ofembodiment. The strong versions of embodied cognition (SVEC) have been successful inexplaining how concrete concepts (e.g., pencil) may be understood based on sensoryprocesses, yet they have failed to offer a...
| Autores: | , , , , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2021 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha |
| Repositorio: | RUIdeRA. Repositorio Institucional de la UCLM |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ruidera.uclm.es:10578/44779 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pne0000252 https://hdl.handle.net/10578/44779 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Abstract concepts Cognitive neuroscience Conceptual metaphor Non-actual motion sentences Strong and weak embodiment |
| Sumario: | The aim of this article is to discuss three challenges to the so-called “strong” versions ofembodiment. The strong versions of embodied cognition (SVEC) have been successful inexplaining how concrete concepts (e.g., pencil) may be understood based on sensoryprocesses, yet they have failed to offer a comprehensive understanding of abstract concepts(e.g., freedom). In this regard, this article pinpoints three areas where the SVEC facelimitations. First, the SVEC fail to fully support the active or passive perspective that anagent may assume when processing abstract concepts via embodied metaphorical representations.Second, theSVECdonot offer a compelling explanation for three different typesof mental simulation proposed for the representation of nonactual motion semantics:enactive perception, perceptual scanning, and imagination. Third, theSVECfail to accountfor inter-individual, cross-cultural, and context-dependency in the representation ofabstract concepts. To summarize, we argue that the findings from the SVEC should beintegrated into broader “weak” embodiment theoretical perspectives, which propose thatsensory–motor and modality-independent systems are involved in conceptual representations.Finally, we discuss the implications of our core argument in cognitive neuroscience. |
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