Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting

We study axiomatically situations in which the society agrees to treat voters with different characteristics distinctly. In this setting, we propose a set of intuitive axioms and show that they jointly characterize a new class of voting procedures, called Type-weighted Approval Voting. According to...

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Bibliographic Details
Authors: Alcalde Unzu, Jorge, Vorsatz, Marc
Format: article
Status:Versión aceptada para publicación
Publication Date:2013
Country:España
Institution:Universidad San Jorge (USJ)
Repository:Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
OAI Identifier:oai:academica-e.unavarra.es:2454/18602
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/2454/18602
Access Level:Open access
Keyword:Approval voting
Characterization
Anonymity
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spelling Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of Approval VotingAlcalde Unzu, JorgeVorsatz, MarcApproval votingCharacterizationAnonymityWe study axiomatically situations in which the society agrees to treat voters with different characteristics distinctly. In this setting, we propose a set of intuitive axioms and show that they jointly characterize a new class of voting procedures, called Type-weighted Approval Voting. According to this family, each voter has a strictly positive and finite weight (the weight is necessarily the same for all voters with the same characteristics) and the alternative with the highest number of weighted votes is elected. The implemented voting procedure reduces to Approval Voting in case all voters are identical or the procedure assigns the same weight to all types. Using this idea, we also obtain a new characterization of Approval Voting.The first author’s financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science, through the project ECO2012–34202, and Fundación Ramón Areces is gratefully acknowledged. The second author’s financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science, through the project ECO2012–31985, and Fundación Ramón Areces is gratefully acknowledged.ElsevierEconomíaEkonomia2013info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2454/18602reponame:Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarrainstname:Universidad San Jorge (USJ)Inglésinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO//ECO2012-34202info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO//ECO2012-31985© 2013 Elsevier B.V. The manuscript version is made available under the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licensehttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:academica-e.unavarra.es:2454/186022026-06-17T12:41:47Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting
title Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting
spellingShingle Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting
Alcalde Unzu, Jorge
Approval voting
Characterization
Anonymity
title_short Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting
title_full Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting
title_fullStr Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting
title_full_unstemmed Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting
title_sort Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Alcalde Unzu, Jorge
Vorsatz, Marc
author Alcalde Unzu, Jorge
author_facet Alcalde Unzu, Jorge
Vorsatz, Marc
author_role author
author2 Vorsatz, Marc
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Economía
Ekonomia
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Approval voting
Characterization
Anonymity
topic Approval voting
Characterization
Anonymity
description We study axiomatically situations in which the society agrees to treat voters with different characteristics distinctly. In this setting, we propose a set of intuitive axioms and show that they jointly characterize a new class of voting procedures, called Type-weighted Approval Voting. According to this family, each voter has a strictly positive and finite weight (the weight is necessarily the same for all voters with the same characteristics) and the alternative with the highest number of weighted votes is elected. The implemented voting procedure reduces to Approval Voting in case all voters are identical or the procedure assigns the same weight to all types. Using this idea, we also obtain a new characterization of Approval Voting.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2454/18602
url https://hdl.handle.net/2454/18602
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO//ECO2012-34202
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO//ECO2012-31985
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv © 2013 Elsevier B.V. The manuscript version is made available under the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv © 2013 Elsevier B.V. The manuscript version is made available under the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
instname:Universidad San Jorge (USJ)
instname_str Universidad San Jorge (USJ)
reponame_str Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
collection Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15,300724

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