Welfare benefits in highly decentralized fiscal systems: Evidence on interregional mimicking
This paper analyzes the determinants of welfare benefit levels within a highly fiscally decentralized context. More specifically, we analyze the role of mimicking as a driver of the institutional design of subnational government policies in the absence of federal co-ordination and financing. Empiric...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2024 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia |
| Repositorio: | e-spacio. Repositorio Institucional de la UNED |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:e-spacio.uned.es:20.500.14468/30753 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14468/30753 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | 5303 Contabilidad pública 5304 Actividad económica welfare fiscal federalism yardstick competition inequality |
| Sumario: | This paper analyzes the determinants of welfare benefit levels within a highly fiscally decentralized context. More specifically, we analyze the role of mimicking as a driver of the institutional design of subnational government policies in the absence of federal co-ordination and financing. Empirically we focus on the welfare benefit programs of Spanish regional governments during the period 1996-2015. Our results strongly support the significant role played by mimicking: regional public agents observe what their peers are doing and act accordingly, and this holds even in a context of low mobility of households. |
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