The philosophical significance of the De Se

Inspired by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued that, among singular thoughts in general, thoughts about oneself 'as oneself' - first-personal thoughts, which Lewis aptly called de se - call for special treatment: we need to abandon one of two traditional assumptions on the contents needed t...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: García-Carpintero, Manuel
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2017
País:España
Institución:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repositorio:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:2445/106300
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/106300
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Subjectivitat
Pensament
Subjectivity
Thinking
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spelling The philosophical significance of the De SeGarcía-Carpintero, ManuelSubjectivitatPensamentSubjectivityThinkingInspired by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued that, among singular thoughts in general, thoughts about oneself 'as oneself' - first-personal thoughts, which Lewis aptly called de se - call for special treatment: we need to abandon one of two traditional assumptions on the contents needed to provide rationalizing explanations, their shareability or their absoluteness. Their arguments have been very influential; one might take them as establishing a new 'effect' - new philosophical evidence in need of being accounted for. This is questioned by the skeptical arguments in recent work by Cappelen & Dever and Magidor, along lines that a few discrepant voices had already announced earlier. Skeptics content that the evidence does not really call for revising traditional theories of content. I will discuss their challenges - first and foremost, concerning action explanations - aiming to make the case that the 'De Se effect' is no illusion: de se attitudes require us to revise one of the two tenets of traditional views.Oslo University Press2017201820172017info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion27 p.application/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/106300Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunyainstname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)InglésVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1262003Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 2017, vol. 60, num. 3https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1262003(c) Oslo University Press, 2017info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:recercat.cat:2445/1063002026-05-29T05:05:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The philosophical significance of the De Se
title The philosophical significance of the De Se
spellingShingle The philosophical significance of the De Se
García-Carpintero, Manuel
Subjectivitat
Pensament
Subjectivity
Thinking
title_short The philosophical significance of the De Se
title_full The philosophical significance of the De Se
title_fullStr The philosophical significance of the De Se
title_full_unstemmed The philosophical significance of the De Se
title_sort The philosophical significance of the De Se
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv García-Carpintero, Manuel
author García-Carpintero, Manuel
author_facet García-Carpintero, Manuel
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Subjectivitat
Pensament
Subjectivity
Thinking
topic Subjectivitat
Pensament
Subjectivity
Thinking
description Inspired by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued that, among singular thoughts in general, thoughts about oneself 'as oneself' - first-personal thoughts, which Lewis aptly called de se - call for special treatment: we need to abandon one of two traditional assumptions on the contents needed to provide rationalizing explanations, their shareability or their absoluteness. Their arguments have been very influential; one might take them as establishing a new 'effect' - new philosophical evidence in need of being accounted for. This is questioned by the skeptical arguments in recent work by Cappelen & Dever and Magidor, along lines that a few discrepant voices had already announced earlier. Skeptics content that the evidence does not really call for revising traditional theories of content. I will discuss their challenges - first and foremost, concerning action explanations - aiming to make the case that the 'De Se effect' is no illusion: de se attitudes require us to revise one of the two tenets of traditional views.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017
2017
2017
2018
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/106300
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/106300
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1262003
Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 2017, vol. 60, num. 3
https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1262003
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv (c) Oslo University Press, 2017
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv (c) Oslo University Press, 2017
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv 27 p.
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Oslo University Press
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Oslo University Press
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
instname_str Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
reponame_str Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
collection Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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