The firm logic of parallel lobbying: explaining why corporations lobby directly in addition to their associations

Firms lobby public institutions even when associations they are members of are lobbying those same institutions. This is what we conceptualise as ‘parallel lobbying’. Firms engage in parallel lobbying to monitor associations they are members of, reinforce the message delivered by the associations, p...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Albareda, Adrià, Coen, David, Saz-Carranza, Angel
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2025
País:España
Institución:Universitat Ramon Llull (URL)
Repositorio:DAU Arxiu Digital de la Universitat Ramon Llull
OAI Identifier:oai:dau.url.edu:20.500.14342/5903
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14342/5903
https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2025.2534653
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Lobbying
Firms
Business associations
European Union
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spelling The firm logic of parallel lobbying: explaining why corporations lobby directly in addition to their associationsAlbareda, AdriàCoen, DavidSaz-Carranza, AngelLobbyingFirmsBusiness associationsEuropean UnionFirms lobby public institutions even when associations they are members of are lobbying those same institutions. This is what we conceptualise as ‘parallel lobbying’. Firms engage in parallel lobbying to monitor associations they are members of, reinforce the message delivered by the associations, provide additional or nuanced information that goes beyond the lowest common denominator, or even to break ranks from the collective position and signal a different message to the one provided by the association. Regardless of what the rationale behind these parallel meetings is, this article intends to bring new light into this phenomenon by examining the extent to which parallel lobbying occurs at the EU level and, more importantly, unveiling what firm – and association-level characteristics explain why firms exercise parallel lobbying. We rely on large-n dataset of meetings held by companies, associations, and EU public officials between 2014 and 2023. Our findings partially confirm that firm characteristics relate to parallel lobbying. Yet, the occurrence of parallel meetings seems to be mostly driven by association-level features. This study provides new insights into an under-examined phenomenon that affects the quality and legitimacy of our governance systems.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionInforma UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis GroupUniversitat Ramon Llull. Esade202620262025info:eu-repo/semantics/article24 p.application/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14342/5903https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2025.2534653reponame:DAU Arxiu Digital de la Universitat Ramon Llullinstname:Universitat Ramon Llull (URL)InglésJournal of European Public Policy© L'autor/aAttribution 4.0 Internationalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:dau.url.edu:20.500.14342/59032026-06-21T06:40:37Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The firm logic of parallel lobbying: explaining why corporations lobby directly in addition to their associations
title The firm logic of parallel lobbying: explaining why corporations lobby directly in addition to their associations
spellingShingle The firm logic of parallel lobbying: explaining why corporations lobby directly in addition to their associations
Albareda, Adrià
Lobbying
Firms
Business associations
European Union
title_short The firm logic of parallel lobbying: explaining why corporations lobby directly in addition to their associations
title_full The firm logic of parallel lobbying: explaining why corporations lobby directly in addition to their associations
title_fullStr The firm logic of parallel lobbying: explaining why corporations lobby directly in addition to their associations
title_full_unstemmed The firm logic of parallel lobbying: explaining why corporations lobby directly in addition to their associations
title_sort The firm logic of parallel lobbying: explaining why corporations lobby directly in addition to their associations
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Albareda, Adrià
Coen, David
Saz-Carranza, Angel
author Albareda, Adrià
author_facet Albareda, Adrià
Coen, David
Saz-Carranza, Angel
author_role author
author2 Coen, David
Saz-Carranza, Angel
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Universitat Ramon Llull. Esade
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Lobbying
Firms
Business associations
European Union
topic Lobbying
Firms
Business associations
European Union
description Firms lobby public institutions even when associations they are members of are lobbying those same institutions. This is what we conceptualise as ‘parallel lobbying’. Firms engage in parallel lobbying to monitor associations they are members of, reinforce the message delivered by the associations, provide additional or nuanced information that goes beyond the lowest common denominator, or even to break ranks from the collective position and signal a different message to the one provided by the association. Regardless of what the rationale behind these parallel meetings is, this article intends to bring new light into this phenomenon by examining the extent to which parallel lobbying occurs at the EU level and, more importantly, unveiling what firm – and association-level characteristics explain why firms exercise parallel lobbying. We rely on large-n dataset of meetings held by companies, associations, and EU public officials between 2014 and 2023. Our findings partially confirm that firm characteristics relate to parallel lobbying. Yet, the occurrence of parallel meetings seems to be mostly driven by association-level features. This study provides new insights into an under-examined phenomenon that affects the quality and legitimacy of our governance systems.
publishDate 2025
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2025
2026
2026
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14342/5903
https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2025.2534653
url http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14342/5903
https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2025.2534653
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Journal of European Public Policy
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv © L'autor/a
Attribution 4.0 International
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv © L'autor/a
Attribution 4.0 International
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv 24 p.
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:DAU Arxiu Digital de la Universitat Ramon Llull
instname:Universitat Ramon Llull (URL)
instname_str Universitat Ramon Llull (URL)
reponame_str DAU Arxiu Digital de la Universitat Ramon Llull
collection DAU Arxiu Digital de la Universitat Ramon Llull
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15,812429

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