On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets

We analyze the manipulability of competitive equilibrium allocation rules for the simplest many-to-many extension of Shapley and Shubik's (Int J Game Theory 1:111-130, 1972) assignment game. First, we show that if an agent has a quota of one, then she does not have an incentive to manipulate an...

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Autores: Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621, Sotomayor, Marilda A. Oliveira
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2017
País:España
Institución:Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:ddd.uab.cat:171311
Acceso en línea:https://ddd.uab.cat/record/171311
https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1007/s00182-017-0573-y
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Matching
Competitive equilibrium
Optimal competitive equilibrium
Manipulability
Competitive equilibrium rule
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spelling On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller marketsPérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621Sotomayor, Marilda A. OliveiraMatchingCompetitive equilibriumOptimal competitive equilibriumManipulabilityCompetitive equilibrium ruleWe analyze the manipulability of competitive equilibrium allocation rules for the simplest many-to-many extension of Shapley and Shubik's (Int J Game Theory 1:111-130, 1972) assignment game. First, we show that if an agent has a quota of one, then she does not have an incentive to manipulate any competitive equilibrium rule that gives her her most preferred competitive equilibrium payoff when she reports truthfully. In particular, this result extends to the one-to-many (respectively, many-to-one) models the Non-Manipulability Theorem of the buyers (respectively, sellers), proven by Demange (Strategyproofness in the assignment market game. École Polytechnique, Laboratoire d'Économetrie, Paris, 1982), Leonard (J Polit Econ 91:461-479, 1983), and Demange and Gale (Econometrica 55:873-888, 1985) for the assignment game. Second, we prove a "General Manipulability Theorem" that implies and generalizes two "folk theorems" for the assignment game, the Manipulability Theorem and the General Impossibility Theorem, never proven before. For the one-to-one case, this result provides a sort of converse of the Non-Manipulability Theorem. 22017-01-0120172017-01-01Articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501AMhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aainfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://ddd.uab.cat/record/171311https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1007/s00182-017-0573-yreponame:Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UABinstname:Universitat Autònoma de BarcelonaInglésengMinisterio de Economía y Competitividad https://doi.org/10.13039/501100003329 ECO2012-31962Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad https://doi.org/10.13039/501100003329 EECO2015-63679-PAgència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca https://doi.org/10.13039/501100003030 2014/SGR-142Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad https://doi.org/10.13039/501100003329 SEV-2015-0563open accesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Aquest material està protegit per drets d'autor i/o drets afins. Podeu utilitzar aquest material en funció del que permet la legislació de drets d'autor i drets afins d'aplicació al vostre cas. Per a d'altres usos heu d'obtenir permís del(s) titular(s) de drets.https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:ddd.uab.cat:1713112026-06-06T12:50:31Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
title On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
spellingShingle On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
Matching
Competitive equilibrium
Optimal competitive equilibrium
Manipulability
Competitive equilibrium rule
title_short On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
title_full On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
title_fullStr On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
title_full_unstemmed On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
title_sort On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
Sotomayor, Marilda A. Oliveira
author Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
author_facet Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
Sotomayor, Marilda A. Oliveira
author_role author
author2 Sotomayor, Marilda A. Oliveira
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Matching
Competitive equilibrium
Optimal competitive equilibrium
Manipulability
Competitive equilibrium rule
topic Matching
Competitive equilibrium
Optimal competitive equilibrium
Manipulability
Competitive equilibrium rule
description We analyze the manipulability of competitive equilibrium allocation rules for the simplest many-to-many extension of Shapley and Shubik's (Int J Game Theory 1:111-130, 1972) assignment game. First, we show that if an agent has a quota of one, then she does not have an incentive to manipulate any competitive equilibrium rule that gives her her most preferred competitive equilibrium payoff when she reports truthfully. In particular, this result extends to the one-to-many (respectively, many-to-one) models the Non-Manipulability Theorem of the buyers (respectively, sellers), proven by Demange (Strategyproofness in the assignment market game. École Polytechnique, Laboratoire d'Économetrie, Paris, 1982), Leonard (J Polit Econ 91:461-479, 1983), and Demange and Gale (Econometrica 55:873-888, 1985) for the assignment game. Second, we prove a "General Manipulability Theorem" that implies and generalizes two "folk theorems" for the assignment game, the Manipulability Theorem and the General Impossibility Theorem, never proven before. For the one-to-one case, this result provides a sort of converse of the Non-Manipulability Theorem.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2
2017-01-01
2017
2017-01-01
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv Article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
AM
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa
dc.type.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://ddd.uab.cat/record/171311
https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1007/s00182-017-0573-y
url https://ddd.uab.cat/record/171311
https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1007/s00182-017-0573-y
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
eng
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad https://doi.org/10.13039/501100003329 ECO2012-31962
Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad https://doi.org/10.13039/501100003329 EECO2015-63679-P
Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca https://doi.org/10.13039/501100003030 2014/SGR-142
Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad https://doi.org/10.13039/501100003329 SEV-2015-0563
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.rights.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
instname:Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
instname_str Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
collection Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
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