'Ghost citizens': Using notches to identify manipulation of population-based grants

This paper analyzes how local governments misreport population figures to obtain higher per capita grant allocations. In 1998, the allocation of a formula based grant in Spain switched from using the centrally administered census to local population registers administered by municipalities. The valu...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Foremny, Dirk, Jofre Monseny, Jordi, Solé Ollé, Albert
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2017
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
OAI Identifier:oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/119365
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/119365
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Estadística demogràfica
Administració local
Subvencions
Vital statistics
Local government
Subsidies
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spelling 'Ghost citizens': Using notches to identify manipulation of population-based grantsForemny, DirkJofre Monseny, JordiSolé Ollé, AlbertEstadística demogràficaAdministració localSubvencionsVital statisticsLocal governmentSubsidiesThis paper analyzes how local governments misreport population figures to obtain higher per capita grant allocations. In 1998, the allocation of a formula based grant in Spain switched from using the centrally administered census to local population registers administered by municipalities. The value of this per capita grant changes at fixed population thresholds for the entire local population. We exploit these notches to analyze the size distribution of municipalities to detect deliberate manipulation of the grant-assignment variable. This allows us to causally identify the effect of grant generosity on population over-reporting. We document an excess mass of municipalities to the right of the notch threshold and a density hole to the left of it: local registers included a proportion of 'ghost citizens', that is, people who presented no trace of actually residing in the municipalities which benefit the most from inflating population figures to pass the relevant threshold. We document that manipulation (rather than real population responses) is the mechanism at work. The main channel behind manipulation is the incorrect treatment of foreign residents to inflate total local population. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.Elsevier B.V.2017info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/119365Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UBinstname:Universidad de BarcelonaInglésVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.08.011Journal of Public Economics, 2017, vol. 154, num. October, p. 49-66https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.08.011cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2017http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/esinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/1193652026-05-27T06:46:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv 'Ghost citizens': Using notches to identify manipulation of population-based grants
title 'Ghost citizens': Using notches to identify manipulation of population-based grants
spellingShingle 'Ghost citizens': Using notches to identify manipulation of population-based grants
Foremny, Dirk
Estadística demogràfica
Administració local
Subvencions
Vital statistics
Local government
Subsidies
title_short 'Ghost citizens': Using notches to identify manipulation of population-based grants
title_full 'Ghost citizens': Using notches to identify manipulation of population-based grants
title_fullStr 'Ghost citizens': Using notches to identify manipulation of population-based grants
title_full_unstemmed 'Ghost citizens': Using notches to identify manipulation of population-based grants
title_sort 'Ghost citizens': Using notches to identify manipulation of population-based grants
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Foremny, Dirk
Jofre Monseny, Jordi
Solé Ollé, Albert
author Foremny, Dirk
author_facet Foremny, Dirk
Jofre Monseny, Jordi
Solé Ollé, Albert
author_role author
author2 Jofre Monseny, Jordi
Solé Ollé, Albert
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Estadística demogràfica
Administració local
Subvencions
Vital statistics
Local government
Subsidies
topic Estadística demogràfica
Administració local
Subvencions
Vital statistics
Local government
Subsidies
description This paper analyzes how local governments misreport population figures to obtain higher per capita grant allocations. In 1998, the allocation of a formula based grant in Spain switched from using the centrally administered census to local population registers administered by municipalities. The value of this per capita grant changes at fixed population thresholds for the entire local population. We exploit these notches to analyze the size distribution of municipalities to detect deliberate manipulation of the grant-assignment variable. This allows us to causally identify the effect of grant generosity on population over-reporting. We document an excess mass of municipalities to the right of the notch threshold and a density hole to the left of it: local registers included a proportion of 'ghost citizens', that is, people who presented no trace of actually residing in the municipalities which benefit the most from inflating population figures to pass the relevant threshold. We document that manipulation (rather than real population responses) is the mechanism at work. The main channel behind manipulation is the incorrect treatment of foreign residents to inflate total local population. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/119365
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/119365
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.08.011
Journal of Public Economics, 2017, vol. 154, num. October, p. 49-66
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.08.011
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2017
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2017
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier B.V.
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier B.V.
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)
reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
instname:Universidad de Barcelona
instname_str Universidad de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de la UB
collection Dipòsit Digital de la UB
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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