On single-peakedness and strategy-proofness: ties between adjacent alternatives
We extend the classical characterizations of social choice rules that satisfy strategy-proofness in the single-peaked domain of preferences by Moulin (Public Choice, 1980) and Barberà, Gul, and Stacchetti (Journal of Economic Theory, 1993) to multivalued social choice rules that admit either the sel...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Data de publicação: | 2017 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM) |
| Repositório: | Docta Complutense |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/18852 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/18852 |
| Access Level: | Acceso aberto |
| Palavra-chave: | Strategy-Proofness Single-Peaked Preferences Preferences over Sets of Alternatives Minimally Extended Social Choice Functions. Teoría de Juegos Microeconomía 1207.06 Teoría de Juegos 5307.15 Teoría Microeconómica |
| Resumo: | We extend the classical characterizations of social choice rules that satisfy strategy-proofness in the single-peaked domain of preferences by Moulin (Public Choice, 1980) and Barberà, Gul, and Stacchetti (Journal of Economic Theory, 1993) to multivalued social choice rules that admit either the selection of single alternatives or the selection of pairs of adjacent alternatives. |
|---|