Varying power configurations and the accountability of independent regulatory agencies

Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) have a significant capability to choose how to implement their decisions to be effective, given the mix of managerial autonomy, supervisory powers and political independence that most of these agencies enjoy. As such, traditional approaches which focus on their...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autores: Apaydin, Fulya, Jordana, Jacint
Formato: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2020
País:España
Recursos:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repositorio:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:10230/46571
Acesso em linha:http://hdl.handle.net/10230/46571
http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/irpp.1458
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:Regulation
Independence
Voluntary accountability
Regulatory governance
Delegation
Asymmetries of power
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spelling Varying power configurations and the accountability of independent regulatory agenciesApaydin, FulyaJordana, JacintRegulationIndependenceVoluntary accountabilityRegulatory governanceDelegationAsymmetries of powerIndependent regulatory agencies (IRAs) have a significant capability to choose how to implement their decisions to be effective, given the mix of managerial autonomy, supervisory powers and political independence that most of these agencies enjoy. As such, traditional approaches which focus on their institutional characteristics or their reputational problems do not fully capture the variation in IRAs’ behavior. This paper suggests a complementary approach to interpreting IRAs’ autonomous behavior, focusing on the possibilities that the practice of accountability offers to these public agencies to make relevant choices for the agency itself and the policy environment. To that end, we identify a key background variable that affects the practice of IRAs, namely, the varying power configurations existing among the regulatees and focus on how this factor shapes their voluntary accountability in different contexts. Lastly, we examine several cases of IRA accountability behavior to discuss whether the patterns we submit might constitute a starting point for a theoretical development on the use of accountability by IRAs.This research was funded by the Spanish Ministry of Industry and Competitiveness under the ACCOUNTREG Project (Grant CSO2012-396939).International Public Policy Association202120212020info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10230/46571http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/irpp.1458reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunyainstname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)InglésInternational Review of Public Policy. 2020;2(3):342-57info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/3PN/CSO2012-396939International Review of Public Policy is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:recercat.cat:10230/465712026-05-29T05:05:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Varying power configurations and the accountability of independent regulatory agencies
title Varying power configurations and the accountability of independent regulatory agencies
spellingShingle Varying power configurations and the accountability of independent regulatory agencies
Apaydin, Fulya
Regulation
Independence
Voluntary accountability
Regulatory governance
Delegation
Asymmetries of power
title_short Varying power configurations and the accountability of independent regulatory agencies
title_full Varying power configurations and the accountability of independent regulatory agencies
title_fullStr Varying power configurations and the accountability of independent regulatory agencies
title_full_unstemmed Varying power configurations and the accountability of independent regulatory agencies
title_sort Varying power configurations and the accountability of independent regulatory agencies
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Apaydin, Fulya
Jordana, Jacint
author Apaydin, Fulya
author_facet Apaydin, Fulya
Jordana, Jacint
author_role author
author2 Jordana, Jacint
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Regulation
Independence
Voluntary accountability
Regulatory governance
Delegation
Asymmetries of power
topic Regulation
Independence
Voluntary accountability
Regulatory governance
Delegation
Asymmetries of power
description Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) have a significant capability to choose how to implement their decisions to be effective, given the mix of managerial autonomy, supervisory powers and political independence that most of these agencies enjoy. As such, traditional approaches which focus on their institutional characteristics or their reputational problems do not fully capture the variation in IRAs’ behavior. This paper suggests a complementary approach to interpreting IRAs’ autonomous behavior, focusing on the possibilities that the practice of accountability offers to these public agencies to make relevant choices for the agency itself and the policy environment. To that end, we identify a key background variable that affects the practice of IRAs, namely, the varying power configurations existing among the regulatees and focus on how this factor shapes their voluntary accountability in different contexts. Lastly, we examine several cases of IRA accountability behavior to discuss whether the patterns we submit might constitute a starting point for a theoretical development on the use of accountability by IRAs.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2020
2021
2021
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10230/46571
http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/irpp.1458
url http://hdl.handle.net/10230/46571
http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/irpp.1458
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv International Review of Public Policy. 2020;2(3):342-57
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/3PN/CSO2012-396939
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv International Public Policy Association
publisher.none.fl_str_mv International Public Policy Association
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
instname_str Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
reponame_str Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
collection Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15.811543

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