Deflationary Truth, Ordinary Truth and Relative Truth
Horwich (Mind 123(491), 2014) has argued that only someone with inflationary tendencies could feel inclined to endorse truth relativism. In doing so, he argues that deflationism about truth entails the denial of relativism. If sound, Horwich’s argument could entail that truth relativism is incompati...
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2023 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universidad de Murcia |
| Repositorio: | DIGITUM. Depósito Digital Institucional de la Universidad de Murcia |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:digitum.um.es:10201/130789 |
| Acesso em linha: | http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/daimon.463831 http://hdl.handle.net/10201/130789 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Relativismo de la Verdad Truth Relativism Radical Relativism Deflationism Relativismo Radical Deflacionismo CDU::1 - Filosofía y psicología |
| Resumo: | Horwich (Mind 123(491), 2014) has argued that only someone with inflationary tendencies could feel inclined to endorse truth relativism. In doing so, he argues that deflationism about truth entails the denial of relativism. If sound, Horwich’s argument could entail that truth relativism is incompatible with any concep-tion of our ordinary truth predicate according to which there is some sort of equivalence between a groundlanguage claim that p and the corre-sponding claim that p is true. Arguably, any story the relativist might give about our ordinary truth predicate should entail some such equivalence. Hence, there is a problem for truth relativism that needs to be addressed. |
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