Information frictions and market power: A laboratory study

In a laboratory experiment with supply function competition and private information about correlated costs we study whether cost interdependence leads to greater market power in relation to when costs are uncorrelated in the ways predicted by Bayesian supply function equilibrium. We find that with u...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autores: Bayona, Anna, Brandts, Jordi, Vives, Xavier
Tipo de documento: artigo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Data de publicação:2020
País:España
Recursos:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
Repositório:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
OAI Identifier:oai:digital.csic.es:10261/219630
Acesso em linha:http://hdl.handle.net/10261/219630
Access Level:Acceso aberto
Palavra-chave:Supply function competition
Private information
Wholesale electricity market
Descrição
Resumo:In a laboratory experiment with supply function competition and private information about correlated costs we study whether cost interdependence leads to greater market power in relation to when costs are uncorrelated in the ways predicted by Bayesian supply function equilibrium. We find that with uncorrelated costs observed behavior is close to the theoretical benchmark. However, with interdependent costs and precise private signals, market power does not raise above the case of uncorrelated costs contrary to the theoretical prediction. This is consistent with subjects not being able to make inferences from the market price when costs are interdependent. We find that this effect is less severe when private signals are noisier.