A practical implementation attack on weak pseudorandom number generator designs for EPC Gen2 tags

The Electronic Product Code Generation 2 (EPC Gen2) is an international standard that proposes the use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) in the supply chain. It is designed to balance cost and functionality. As a consequence, security on board of EPC Gen2 tags is often minimal. It is, indeed,...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Melià-Seguí, Joan, Garcia-Alfaro, Joaquin, Herrera-Joancomartí, Jordi
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2010
País:España
Institución:Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC)
Repositorio:O2, repositorio institucional de la UOC
OAI Identifier:oai:openaccess.uoc.edu:10609/109802
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10609/109802
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:RFID
EPC Gen2
PRNG
security
eavesdropping
attack
implementation
seguretat
espionatge
atac
implementació
seguridad
espionaje
ataque
implementación
Computer security
Seguretat informàtica
Seguridad informática
id ES_c4d2df8a05a63cb61b6f7e7d286ae3dd
oai_identifier_str oai:openaccess.uoc.edu:10609/109802
network_acronym_str ES
network_name_str España
repository_id_str
spelling A practical implementation attack on weak pseudorandom number generator designs for EPC Gen2 tagsMelià-Seguí, JoanGarcia-Alfaro, JoaquinHerrera-Joancomartí, JordiRFIDEPC Gen2PRNGsecurityeavesdroppingattackimplementationRFIDEPC Gen2PRNGseguretatespionatgeatacimplementacióRFIDEPC Gen2PRNGseguridadespionajeataqueimplementaciónComputer securitySeguretat informàticaSeguridad informáticaThe Electronic Product Code Generation 2 (EPC Gen2) is an international standard that proposes the use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) in the supply chain. It is designed to balance cost and functionality. As a consequence, security on board of EPC Gen2 tags is often minimal. It is, indeed, mainly based on the use of on board pseudorandomness, used to obscure the communication between readers and tags; and to acknowledge the proper execution of password-protected operations. In this paper, we present a practical implementation attack on a weak pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) designed specifically for EPC Gen2 tags. We show that it is feasible to eavesdrop a small amount of pseudorandom values by using standard EPC commands and using them to determine the PRNG configuration that allows to predict the complete output sequence.Wireless Personal CommunicationsUniversitat Oberta de Catalunya. Internet Interdisciplinary Institute (IN3)Institut Mines-TélécomUniversitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB)202020202010info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10609/109802reponame:O2, repositorio institucional de la UOCinstname:Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC)InglésWireless Personal Communications, 2011, 59(1)https://doi.org/10.1007/s11277-010-0187-1info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/CONSOLIDER CSD2007-00004 ARES//info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/TSI2007-65406-C03-03 E-AEGIS//CC BY-NC-NDhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:openaccess.uoc.edu:10609/1098022026-05-28T12:42:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A practical implementation attack on weak pseudorandom number generator designs for EPC Gen2 tags
title A practical implementation attack on weak pseudorandom number generator designs for EPC Gen2 tags
spellingShingle A practical implementation attack on weak pseudorandom number generator designs for EPC Gen2 tags
Melià-Seguí, Joan
RFID
EPC Gen2
PRNG
security
eavesdropping
attack
implementation
RFID
EPC Gen2
PRNG
seguretat
espionatge
atac
implementació
RFID
EPC Gen2
PRNG
seguridad
espionaje
ataque
implementación
Computer security
Seguretat informàtica
Seguridad informática
title_short A practical implementation attack on weak pseudorandom number generator designs for EPC Gen2 tags
title_full A practical implementation attack on weak pseudorandom number generator designs for EPC Gen2 tags
title_fullStr A practical implementation attack on weak pseudorandom number generator designs for EPC Gen2 tags
title_full_unstemmed A practical implementation attack on weak pseudorandom number generator designs for EPC Gen2 tags
title_sort A practical implementation attack on weak pseudorandom number generator designs for EPC Gen2 tags
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Melià-Seguí, Joan
Garcia-Alfaro, Joaquin
Herrera-Joancomartí, Jordi
author Melià-Seguí, Joan
author_facet Melià-Seguí, Joan
Garcia-Alfaro, Joaquin
Herrera-Joancomartí, Jordi
author_role author
author2 Garcia-Alfaro, Joaquin
Herrera-Joancomartí, Jordi
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Universitat Oberta de Catalunya. Internet Interdisciplinary Institute (IN3)
Institut Mines-Télécom
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB)
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv RFID
EPC Gen2
PRNG
security
eavesdropping
attack
implementation
RFID
EPC Gen2
PRNG
seguretat
espionatge
atac
implementació
RFID
EPC Gen2
PRNG
seguridad
espionaje
ataque
implementación
Computer security
Seguretat informàtica
Seguridad informática
topic RFID
EPC Gen2
PRNG
security
eavesdropping
attack
implementation
RFID
EPC Gen2
PRNG
seguretat
espionatge
atac
implementació
RFID
EPC Gen2
PRNG
seguridad
espionaje
ataque
implementación
Computer security
Seguretat informàtica
Seguridad informática
description The Electronic Product Code Generation 2 (EPC Gen2) is an international standard that proposes the use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) in the supply chain. It is designed to balance cost and functionality. As a consequence, security on board of EPC Gen2 tags is often minimal. It is, indeed, mainly based on the use of on board pseudorandomness, used to obscure the communication between readers and tags; and to acknowledge the proper execution of password-protected operations. In this paper, we present a practical implementation attack on a weak pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) designed specifically for EPC Gen2 tags. We show that it is feasible to eavesdrop a small amount of pseudorandom values by using standard EPC commands and using them to determine the PRNG configuration that allows to predict the complete output sequence.
publishDate 2010
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2010
2020
2020
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10609/109802
url http://hdl.handle.net/10609/109802
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Wireless Personal Communications, 2011, 59(1)
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11277-010-0187-1
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/CONSOLIDER CSD2007-00004 ARES//
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/TSI2007-65406-C03-03 E-AEGIS//
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv CC BY-NC-ND
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv CC BY-NC-ND
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wireless Personal Communications
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wireless Personal Communications
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:O2, repositorio institucional de la UOC
instname:Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC)
instname_str Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC)
reponame_str O2, repositorio institucional de la UOC
collection O2, repositorio institucional de la UOC
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1869418935376412672
score 15,300719

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