Uncertainty, complexity, and Gamson's law: comparing coalition formation in Western Europe
According to Gamson's Law, the allocation of cabinet portfolios in parliamentary democracies is proportional to the government parties' legislative seat shares. However, portfolio allocation departs systematically from perfect proportionality. This paper proposes a theory of portfolio allo...
| Autores: | , |
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2013 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/165085 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/165085 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Principi de proporcionalitat (Dret) Coalicions Política Europa occidental Proportionality in law Coalitions Practical politics Western Europe |
| Resumo: | According to Gamson's Law, the allocation of cabinet portfolios in parliamentary democracies is proportional to the government parties' legislative seat shares. However, portfolio allocation departs systematically from perfect proportionality. This paper proposes a theory of portfolio allocation that seeks to explain the variance in proportionality across different bargaining situations. It argues that the degree to which the coalition formation process is characterised by uncertainty and complexity influences portfolio allocation. In uncertain and complex bargaining situations, parties that otherwise would be in an advantageous bargaining position will have a difficult time exploiting their bargaining advantage. As a result, portfolio allocation in such circumstances will be closer to proportionality. These patterns are observed in data on coalition formation in 14 West European parliamentary systems in the period 1945-1999. |
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