Three essays in banking, financial fragility and CEO compensation
This dissertation investigates two issues: (1) banks' funding liquidity risk and its implications, and (2) the optimal design of CEO compensation contracts. The first chapter analyzes the interaction between banks' funding liquidity risk and asset market illiquidity. We emphasize how the l...
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| Tipo de recurso: | tesis doctoral |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2015 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | CBUC, CESCA |
| Repositorio: | TDR. Tesis Doctorales en Red |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:www.tdx.cat:10803/378040 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10803/378040 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Banks Liquidity risk CEO compensation Bancs Risc de liquiditat Contractes de compensació CEO 336 |
| Sumario: | This dissertation investigates two issues: (1) banks' funding liquidity risk and its implications, and (2) the optimal design of CEO compensation contracts. The first chapter analyzes the interaction between banks' funding liquidity risk and asset market illiquidity. We emphasize how the lack of information distorts asset prices. In the model,asset fire sales, bank runs, and financial contagion, are all self-fulfilling, and emerge in a rational expectations equilibrium. The model also delivers new policy insights on bank capital holding and asset purchase programs. The second chapter also relates bank liquidity issues. It emphasizes how credit information sharing schemes can contribute to asset market liquidity, and therefore provides a novel exposition for the existence of such schemes. The last chapter is devoted to the design of CEO compensation contracts, where the coexistence of stock and option grants is rationalized as an optimal contract in a multiplicative model. |
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