Causes of country-specific effect related to the value relevance of cash flows and earnings: evidence from France, Germany, Italy and Spain
Previous studies show that, in common-law countries, the explanatory power of stock returns is higher using cash flows than earnings and accruals, while the opposite is true in code-law countries. Moreover, the literature has shown the existence of a country-specific effect motivated by different ca...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2022 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia |
| Repositorio: | e-spacio. Repositorio Institucional de la UNED |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:e-spacio.uned.es:20.500.14468/11916 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14468/11916 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | cash flow statement country effect code-law articulation error transitory earnings tax rule creditor protection financial structure |
| Sumario: | Previous studies show that, in common-law countries, the explanatory power of stock returns is higher using cash flows than earnings and accruals, while the opposite is true in code-law countries. Moreover, the literature has shown the existence of a country-specific effect motivated by different causes (taxation, financial system, creditor protection, among others). Our aim is to analyze whether this country-specific effect exists among companies in the largest Eurozone countries (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) despite the common regulatory framework, and also to study the causes that explain this country effect. We find empirical evidence that French, Italian and Spanish firms are influenced by tax rules, while German companies are more affected by creditors protection; also, Spain presents a bank-oriented financial system. Besides, the transitory earnings effect, characteristic of code-law countries, is not a cause of the country-specific effect. Therefore, national regulations are more relevant than the general EU regulatory framework. |
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