On Free-will and No-conspiracy
In this paper, I challenge the widespread view that Measurement Independence adequately represents the requirement that EPR experimenters have free will. Measurement Independence is most commonly taken as a necessary condition for free will. A number of implicit assumptions can be identified in this...
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| Tipo de recurso: | capítulo de libro |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2013 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM) |
| Repositorio: | Docta Complutense |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/101358 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/101358 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | 001.1 Filosofía de la Ciencia 7205 Filosofía de la Ciencia 7205.04 Filosofía de la Física |
| Sumario: | In this paper, I challenge the widespread view that Measurement Independence adequately represents the requirement that EPR experimenters have free will. Measurement Independence is most commonly taken as a necessary condition for free will. A number of implicit assumptions can be identified in this regard, all of which can be challenged on their own grounds. As a result, I conclude that Measurement Independence-type conditions are not to be justified by appealing to the preservation of the EPR experimenters’ free will. |
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