Love and justice: a paradox?

Three claims about love and justice cannot be simultaneously true and therefore entail a paradox: (1) Love is a matter of justice. (2) There cannot be a duty to love. (3) All matters of justice are matters of duty. The first claim is more controversial. To defend it, I show why the extent to which w...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Gheaus, Anca
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2017
País:España
Institución:Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Repositorio:Repositorio Digital de la UPF
OAI Identifier:oai:repositori.upf.edu:10230/34278
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10230/34278
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2017.1319656
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Distributive justice
Love
Care
Metric of justice
Duty to love
Feasibility
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spelling Love and justice: a paradox?Gheaus, AncaDistributive justiceLoveCareMetric of justiceDuty to loveFeasibilityThree claims about love and justice cannot be simultaneously true and therefore entail a paradox: (1) Love is a matter of justice. (2) There cannot be a duty to love. (3) All matters of justice are matters of duty. The first claim is more controversial. To defend it, I show why the extent to which we enjoy the good of love is relevant to distributive justice. To defend (2) I explain the empirical, conceptual and axiological arguments in its favour. Although (3) is the most generally endorsed claim of the three, I conclude we should reject it in order to avoid the paradox.This project has received funding from the Ramon y Cajal Programme from the Spanish Government and from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation programme (Grant Agreement Number: 648610).Taylor & Francis (Routledge)20182017info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10230/34278http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2017.1319656reponame:Repositorio Digital de la UPFinstname:Universitat Pompeu FabraInglésCanadian Journal of Philosophy. 2017;47(6):739-59info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/648610© Taylor & Francis. This is an electronic version of an article published in "Gheaus A. Love and justice: a paradox? Can J Philos. Forthcoming 2017". Canadian Journal of Philosophy is available online at: www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00455091.2017.1319656.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:repositori.upf.edu:10230/342782026-06-12T07:21:37Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Love and justice: a paradox?
title Love and justice: a paradox?
spellingShingle Love and justice: a paradox?
Gheaus, Anca
Distributive justice
Love
Care
Metric of justice
Duty to love
Feasibility
title_short Love and justice: a paradox?
title_full Love and justice: a paradox?
title_fullStr Love and justice: a paradox?
title_full_unstemmed Love and justice: a paradox?
title_sort Love and justice: a paradox?
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Gheaus, Anca
author Gheaus, Anca
author_facet Gheaus, Anca
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Distributive justice
Love
Care
Metric of justice
Duty to love
Feasibility
topic Distributive justice
Love
Care
Metric of justice
Duty to love
Feasibility
description Three claims about love and justice cannot be simultaneously true and therefore entail a paradox: (1) Love is a matter of justice. (2) There cannot be a duty to love. (3) All matters of justice are matters of duty. The first claim is more controversial. To defend it, I show why the extent to which we enjoy the good of love is relevant to distributive justice. To defend (2) I explain the empirical, conceptual and axiological arguments in its favour. Although (3) is the most generally endorsed claim of the three, I conclude we should reject it in order to avoid the paradox.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017
2018
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
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dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10230/34278
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2017.1319656
url http://hdl.handle.net/10230/34278
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2017.1319656
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 2017;47(6):739-59
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/648610
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Taylor & Francis (Routledge)
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Taylor & Francis (Routledge)
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio Digital de la UPF
instname:Universitat Pompeu Fabra
instname_str Universitat Pompeu Fabra
reponame_str Repositorio Digital de la UPF
collection Repositorio Digital de la UPF
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