Do we need a (large) committee?

This paper studies committee design when a homogeneous population is uncertain about which alternative is correct, individuals can acquire costly information about the state of the world, and the decision must be taken via voting with the majority rule. We assume verifiability of costs and cost shar...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autores: Gersbach, Hans, Mamageishvili, Akaki, Tejada, Oriol
Formato: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2025
País:España
Recursos:Universidad de Oviedo (UNIOVI)
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
OAI Identifier:oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/227514
Acesso em linha:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/227514
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:Presa de decisions
Relacions monetàries
Informació
Decision making
Monetary relations
Communication
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spelling Do we need a (large) committee?Gersbach, HansMamageishvili, AkakiTejada, OriolPresa de decisionsRelacions monetàriesInformacióDecision makingMonetary relationsCommunicationThis paper studies committee design when a homogeneous population is uncertain about which alternative is correct, individuals can acquire costly information about the state of the world, and the decision must be taken via voting with the majority rule. We assume verifiability of costs and cost sharing, which are realistic assumptions in many applications, e.g. if the time spent in learning is recorded, or if reports have to be produced. We show that the optimal committee size depends on the properties of the cost function and on the size of the population. If either the marginal cost function satisfies a standard single-crossing condition or the population is sufficiently large, it is optimal to delegate voting to a small committee and often to a single individual, in which case no committee is needed at all. If information acquisition costs increase slowly for small values of information, but the magnitude of such costs is large, the optimal committee might comprise many members. Our results add a rationale for the widespread use of small committees for decision-making.Elsevier B.V.2025info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/227514Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UBinstname:Universidad de Oviedo (UNIOVI)InglésReproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105074European Economic Review, 2025, vol. 178https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105074cc-by (c) Gersbach, Hans; Mamageishvili, Akaki; Tejada, Oriol, 2025http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/2275142026-05-27T06:46:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Do we need a (large) committee?
title Do we need a (large) committee?
spellingShingle Do we need a (large) committee?
Gersbach, Hans
Presa de decisions
Relacions monetàries
Informació
Decision making
Monetary relations
Communication
title_short Do we need a (large) committee?
title_full Do we need a (large) committee?
title_fullStr Do we need a (large) committee?
title_full_unstemmed Do we need a (large) committee?
title_sort Do we need a (large) committee?
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Gersbach, Hans
Mamageishvili, Akaki
Tejada, Oriol
author Gersbach, Hans
author_facet Gersbach, Hans
Mamageishvili, Akaki
Tejada, Oriol
author_role author
author2 Mamageishvili, Akaki
Tejada, Oriol
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Presa de decisions
Relacions monetàries
Informació
Decision making
Monetary relations
Communication
topic Presa de decisions
Relacions monetàries
Informació
Decision making
Monetary relations
Communication
description This paper studies committee design when a homogeneous population is uncertain about which alternative is correct, individuals can acquire costly information about the state of the world, and the decision must be taken via voting with the majority rule. We assume verifiability of costs and cost sharing, which are realistic assumptions in many applications, e.g. if the time spent in learning is recorded, or if reports have to be produced. We show that the optimal committee size depends on the properties of the cost function and on the size of the population. If either the marginal cost function satisfies a standard single-crossing condition or the population is sufficiently large, it is optimal to delegate voting to a small committee and often to a single individual, in which case no committee is needed at all. If information acquisition costs increase slowly for small values of information, but the magnitude of such costs is large, the optimal committee might comprise many members. Our results add a rationale for the widespread use of small committees for decision-making.
publishDate 2025
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2025
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/227514
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/227514
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105074
European Economic Review, 2025, vol. 178
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105074
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv cc-by (c) Gersbach, Hans; Mamageishvili, Akaki; Tejada, Oriol, 2025
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv cc-by (c) Gersbach, Hans; Mamageishvili, Akaki; Tejada, Oriol, 2025
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier B.V.
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier B.V.
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)
reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
instname:Universidad de Oviedo (UNIOVI)
instname_str Universidad de Oviedo (UNIOVI)
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de la UB
collection Dipòsit Digital de la UB
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15,812429

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