Self-Involving Representationalism (SIR): A naturalistic Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness

A naturalistic account of phenomenal consciousness is presented: Self-Involving Representationalism. The first step for the project of naturalizing phenomenal consciousness is to make the project itself feasible. The purpose of the fi rst part of this work is to provide a suitable answer to some arg...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Sebastián González, Miguel Ángel
Tipo de recurso: tesis doctoral
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2011
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
OAI Identifier:oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/42078
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/42078
http://hdl.handle.net/10803/32012
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Consciència
Filosofia de la ment
Naturalisme
Consciousness
Philosophy of mind
Naturalism
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spelling Self-Involving Representationalism (SIR): A naturalistic Theory of Phenomenal ConsciousnessSebastián González, Miguel ÁngelConsciènciaFilosofia de la mentNaturalismeConsciousnessPhilosophy of mindNaturalismA naturalistic account of phenomenal consciousness is presented: Self-Involving Representationalism. The first step for the project of naturalizing phenomenal consciousness is to make the project itself feasible. The purpose of the fi rst part of this work is to provide a suitable answer to some arguments presented against this enterprise. I discuss the classical modal and knowledge argument and defend the phenomenal concept strategy against objection by Tye and Chalmers. I also consider some arguments from vagueness against the project. In the second part I will develop the pillars of the theory. In order to make compatible the intuition that phenomenal properties are intrinsic properties of the subject and explain cases of shifted spectrum I appeal following Shoemaker to appearance properties and I follow Egan in the characterization of this properties. According to Self-Involving Representationalism, phenomenally conscious mental states are states that represent a speci c kind of de se content. I argue that in having an experience I do not merely attribute certain properties to the object causing the experience, I attribute to myself being presented with an object with these properties. This content can be naturalized in rst-order terms by appealing to a certain sense of self: the sense of a bounded, living organism adapting to the environment to maintain life and the processes underlying the monitoring of the activity within these bounds.Universitat de BarcelonaPineda Oliva, DavidMacià, JosepUniversitat de Barcelona. Departament de Lògica, Història i Filosofia de la Ciència2011info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/42078http://hdl.handle.net/10803/32012Tesis Doctorals - Departament - Lògica, Història i Filosofia de la Ciènciareponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UBinstname:Universidad de BarcelonaInglés(c) Sebastián González, 2011info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/420782026-05-27T06:46:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Self-Involving Representationalism (SIR): A naturalistic Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness
title Self-Involving Representationalism (SIR): A naturalistic Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness
spellingShingle Self-Involving Representationalism (SIR): A naturalistic Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness
Sebastián González, Miguel Ángel
Consciència
Filosofia de la ment
Naturalisme
Consciousness
Philosophy of mind
Naturalism
title_short Self-Involving Representationalism (SIR): A naturalistic Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness
title_full Self-Involving Representationalism (SIR): A naturalistic Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness
title_fullStr Self-Involving Representationalism (SIR): A naturalistic Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness
title_full_unstemmed Self-Involving Representationalism (SIR): A naturalistic Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness
title_sort Self-Involving Representationalism (SIR): A naturalistic Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Sebastián González, Miguel Ángel
author Sebastián González, Miguel Ángel
author_facet Sebastián González, Miguel Ángel
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Pineda Oliva, David
Macià, Josep
Universitat de Barcelona. Departament de Lògica, Història i Filosofia de la Ciència
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Consciència
Filosofia de la ment
Naturalisme
Consciousness
Philosophy of mind
Naturalism
topic Consciència
Filosofia de la ment
Naturalisme
Consciousness
Philosophy of mind
Naturalism
description A naturalistic account of phenomenal consciousness is presented: Self-Involving Representationalism. The first step for the project of naturalizing phenomenal consciousness is to make the project itself feasible. The purpose of the fi rst part of this work is to provide a suitable answer to some arguments presented against this enterprise. I discuss the classical modal and knowledge argument and defend the phenomenal concept strategy against objection by Tye and Chalmers. I also consider some arguments from vagueness against the project. In the second part I will develop the pillars of the theory. In order to make compatible the intuition that phenomenal properties are intrinsic properties of the subject and explain cases of shifted spectrum I appeal following Shoemaker to appearance properties and I follow Egan in the characterization of this properties. According to Self-Involving Representationalism, phenomenally conscious mental states are states that represent a speci c kind of de se content. I argue that in having an experience I do not merely attribute certain properties to the object causing the experience, I attribute to myself being presented with an object with these properties. This content can be naturalized in rst-order terms by appealing to a certain sense of self: the sense of a bounded, living organism adapting to the environment to maintain life and the processes underlying the monitoring of the activity within these bounds.
publishDate 2011
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2011
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format doctoralThesis
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/42078
http://hdl.handle.net/10803/32012
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/42078
http://hdl.handle.net/10803/32012
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv (c) Sebastián González, 2011
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv (c) Sebastián González, 2011
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universitat de Barcelona
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universitat de Barcelona
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Tesis Doctorals - Departament - Lògica, Història i Filosofia de la Ciència
reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
instname:Universidad de Barcelona
instname_str Universidad de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de la UB
collection Dipòsit Digital de la UB
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15.301603

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