Evaluating groups with the generalized Shapley value
Following the original interpretation of the Shapley value as a priori evaluation of the prospects of a player in a multiperson interaction situation, we intend to apply the Shapley generalized value (introduced formally in Marichal et al. in 2007) as a tool for the assessment of a group of players...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2018 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM) |
| Repositorio: | Docta Complutense |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/116994 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/116994 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Game Theory Group values TU games Shapley value Generalized values Teoría de Juegos 1207.06 Teoría de Juegos |
| Sumario: | Following the original interpretation of the Shapley value as a priori evaluation of the prospects of a player in a multiperson interaction situation, we intend to apply the Shapley generalized value (introduced formally in Marichal et al. in 2007) as a tool for the assessment of a group of players that act as a unit in a coalitional game. We propose an alternative axiomatic characterization which does not use a direct formulation of the classical efficiency property. Relying on this valuation, we also analyze the profitability of a group. We motivate this use of the Shapley generalized value by means of two relevant applications in which it is used as an objective function by a decision maker who is trying to identify an optimal group of agents in a framework in which agents interact and the attained benefit can be modeled by means of a transferable utility game. |
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