Controlling our reasons

[eng] Philosophical discussion on control has largely centred around control over our actions and beliefs. Yet this overlooks the question of whether we also have control over the reasons for which we act and believe. To date, the overriding assumption appears to be that we do not, and with seemingl...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Keeling, Sophie
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2023
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
OAI Identifier:oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/216473
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/216473
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Creença i dubte
Justificació (Teoria del coneixement)
Raó
Belief and doubt
Justification (Theory of Knowledge)
Reason
id ES_ba33604ca7fd2d808d36f43da7ee68e2
oai_identifier_str oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/216473
network_acronym_str ES
network_name_str España
repository_id_str
spelling Controlling our reasonsKeeling, SophieCreença i dubteJustificació (Teoria del coneixement)RaóBelief and doubtJustification (Theory of Knowledge)Reason[eng] Philosophical discussion on control has largely centred around control over our actions and beliefs. Yet this overlooks the question of whether we also have control over the reasons for which we act and believe. To date, the overriding assumption appears to be that we do not, and with seemingly good reason. We cannot choose to act for a reason and acting-for-a-reason is not itself something we do. While some have challenged this in the case of reasons for action, these claims seem especially untenable regarding believing for a reason. And extending the scope of control in this way also faces the threat of regress. In the face of this orthodoxy, the present paper argues that we do in fact have control over both believing and acting for a particular reason. It also starts to develop an account of the way in which this would be possible. Given the broad importance of understanding control and agency, this paper bears on a number of topics in epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and ethics.Wiley2023info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/216473Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UBinstname:Universidad de BarcelonaInglésReproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12431Noûs, 2023, vol. 57, num.4, p. 832-849https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12431cc-by (c) Keeling, Sophie, 2022http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/2164732026-05-27T06:46:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Controlling our reasons
title Controlling our reasons
spellingShingle Controlling our reasons
Keeling, Sophie
Creença i dubte
Justificació (Teoria del coneixement)
Raó
Belief and doubt
Justification (Theory of Knowledge)
Reason
title_short Controlling our reasons
title_full Controlling our reasons
title_fullStr Controlling our reasons
title_full_unstemmed Controlling our reasons
title_sort Controlling our reasons
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Keeling, Sophie
author Keeling, Sophie
author_facet Keeling, Sophie
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Creença i dubte
Justificació (Teoria del coneixement)
Raó
Belief and doubt
Justification (Theory of Knowledge)
Reason
topic Creença i dubte
Justificació (Teoria del coneixement)
Raó
Belief and doubt
Justification (Theory of Knowledge)
Reason
description [eng] Philosophical discussion on control has largely centred around control over our actions and beliefs. Yet this overlooks the question of whether we also have control over the reasons for which we act and believe. To date, the overriding assumption appears to be that we do not, and with seemingly good reason. We cannot choose to act for a reason and acting-for-a-reason is not itself something we do. While some have challenged this in the case of reasons for action, these claims seem especially untenable regarding believing for a reason. And extending the scope of control in this way also faces the threat of regress. In the face of this orthodoxy, the present paper argues that we do in fact have control over both believing and acting for a particular reason. It also starts to develop an account of the way in which this would be possible. Given the broad importance of understanding control and agency, this paper bears on a number of topics in epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and ethics.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/216473
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/216473
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12431
Noûs, 2023, vol. 57, num.4, p. 832-849
https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12431
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv cc-by (c) Keeling, Sophie, 2022
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv cc-by (c) Keeling, Sophie, 2022
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wiley
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wiley
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
instname:Universidad de Barcelona
instname_str Universidad de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de la UB
collection Dipòsit Digital de la UB
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1869417857713963008
score 15.812429

Similares en LA Referencia