Reasoning and choice in the Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD): implications for improving Bayesian reasoning

The Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD) is a two-step decision problem involving counterintuitive conditional probabilities. The first choice is made among three equally probable options, whereas the second choice takes place after the elimination of one of the non-selected options which does not hide the priz...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Tubau Sala, Elisabet, Aguilar Lleyda, David, Johnson, Eric D.
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2015
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
OAI Identifier:oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/100384
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/100384
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Probabilitats
Estadística bayesiana
Probabilities
Bayesian statistical decision
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spelling Reasoning and choice in the Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD): implications for improving Bayesian reasoningTubau Sala, ElisabetAguilar Lleyda, DavidJohnson, Eric D.ProbabilitatsEstadística bayesianaProbabilitiesBayesian statistical decisionThe Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD) is a two-step decision problem involving counterintuitive conditional probabilities. The first choice is made among three equally probable options, whereas the second choice takes place after the elimination of one of the non-selected options which does not hide the prize. Differing from most Bayesian problems, statistical information in the MHD has to be inferred, either by learning outcome probabilities or by reasoning from the presented sequence of events. This often leads to suboptimal decisions and erroneous probability judgments. Specifically, decision makers commonly develop a wrong intuition that final probabilities are equally distributed, together with a preference for their first choice. Several studies have shown that repeated practice enhances sensitivity to the different reward probabilities, but does not facilitate correct Bayesian reasoning. However, modest improvements in probability judgments have been observed after guided explanations. To explain these dissociations, the present review focuses on two types of causes producing the observed biases: Emotional-based choice biases and cognitive limitations in understanding probabilistic information. Among the latter, we identify a crucial cause for the universal difficulty in overcoming the equiprobability illusion: Incomplete representation of prior and conditional probabilities. We conclude that repeated practice and/or high incentives can be effective for overcoming choice biases, but promoting an adequate partitioning of possibilities seems to be necessary for overcoming cognitive illusions and improving Bayesian reasoning.Frontiers Media2015info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/100384Articles publicats en revistes (Cognició, Desenvolupament i Psicologia de l'Educació)reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UBinstname:Universidad de BarcelonaInglésReproducció del document publicat a: http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00353Frontiers in Psychology, 2015, vol. 6, num. 353http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00353cc-by (c) Tubau Sala, Elisabet et al., 2015http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/esinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/1003842026-05-27T06:46:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Reasoning and choice in the Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD): implications for improving Bayesian reasoning
title Reasoning and choice in the Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD): implications for improving Bayesian reasoning
spellingShingle Reasoning and choice in the Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD): implications for improving Bayesian reasoning
Tubau Sala, Elisabet
Probabilitats
Estadística bayesiana
Probabilities
Bayesian statistical decision
title_short Reasoning and choice in the Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD): implications for improving Bayesian reasoning
title_full Reasoning and choice in the Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD): implications for improving Bayesian reasoning
title_fullStr Reasoning and choice in the Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD): implications for improving Bayesian reasoning
title_full_unstemmed Reasoning and choice in the Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD): implications for improving Bayesian reasoning
title_sort Reasoning and choice in the Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD): implications for improving Bayesian reasoning
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Tubau Sala, Elisabet
Aguilar Lleyda, David
Johnson, Eric D.
author Tubau Sala, Elisabet
author_facet Tubau Sala, Elisabet
Aguilar Lleyda, David
Johnson, Eric D.
author_role author
author2 Aguilar Lleyda, David
Johnson, Eric D.
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Probabilitats
Estadística bayesiana
Probabilities
Bayesian statistical decision
topic Probabilitats
Estadística bayesiana
Probabilities
Bayesian statistical decision
description The Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD) is a two-step decision problem involving counterintuitive conditional probabilities. The first choice is made among three equally probable options, whereas the second choice takes place after the elimination of one of the non-selected options which does not hide the prize. Differing from most Bayesian problems, statistical information in the MHD has to be inferred, either by learning outcome probabilities or by reasoning from the presented sequence of events. This often leads to suboptimal decisions and erroneous probability judgments. Specifically, decision makers commonly develop a wrong intuition that final probabilities are equally distributed, together with a preference for their first choice. Several studies have shown that repeated practice enhances sensitivity to the different reward probabilities, but does not facilitate correct Bayesian reasoning. However, modest improvements in probability judgments have been observed after guided explanations. To explain these dissociations, the present review focuses on two types of causes producing the observed biases: Emotional-based choice biases and cognitive limitations in understanding probabilistic information. Among the latter, we identify a crucial cause for the universal difficulty in overcoming the equiprobability illusion: Incomplete representation of prior and conditional probabilities. We conclude that repeated practice and/or high incentives can be effective for overcoming choice biases, but promoting an adequate partitioning of possibilities seems to be necessary for overcoming cognitive illusions and improving Bayesian reasoning.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2015
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/100384
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/100384
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Reproducció del document publicat a: http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00353
Frontiers in Psychology, 2015, vol. 6, num. 353
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00353
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv cc-by (c) Tubau Sala, Elisabet et al., 2015
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv cc-by (c) Tubau Sala, Elisabet et al., 2015
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Frontiers Media
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Frontiers Media
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Cognició, Desenvolupament i Psicologia de l'Educació)
reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
instname:Universidad de Barcelona
instname_str Universidad de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de la UB
collection Dipòsit Digital de la UB
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15,300719

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