Incentives for sharing heterogeneous resources in distributed systems : a participatory approach

Contributory and volunteer computing ecosystems built around a community of participants need, like any other common-pool resources, an adaptive governance mechanism to guarantee the sustainability of the ecosystem. Reciprocity incentive mechanisms based on economic principles have been proved effic...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Vega D'Aurelio, Davide
Tipo de recurso: tesis doctoral
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2015
País:España
Institución:CBUC, CESCA
Repositorio:TDR. Tesis Doctorales en Red
OAI Identifier:oai:www.tdx.cat:10803/336680
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10803/336680
https://dx.doi.org/10.5821/dissertation-2117-96062
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:004
id ES_b59ff02da427d2ffda27fac96a368341
oai_identifier_str oai:www.tdx.cat:10803/336680
network_acronym_str ES
network_name_str España
repository_id_str
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Incentives for sharing heterogeneous resources in distributed systems : a participatory approach
title Incentives for sharing heterogeneous resources in distributed systems : a participatory approach
spellingShingle Incentives for sharing heterogeneous resources in distributed systems : a participatory approach
Vega D'Aurelio, Davide
004
title_short Incentives for sharing heterogeneous resources in distributed systems : a participatory approach
title_full Incentives for sharing heterogeneous resources in distributed systems : a participatory approach
title_fullStr Incentives for sharing heterogeneous resources in distributed systems : a participatory approach
title_full_unstemmed Incentives for sharing heterogeneous resources in distributed systems : a participatory approach
title_sort Incentives for sharing heterogeneous resources in distributed systems : a participatory approach
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Vega D'Aurelio, Davide
author Vega D'Aurelio, Davide
author_facet Vega D'Aurelio, Davide
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Freitag, Felix
Meseguer Pallarès, Roc
Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament d'Arquitectura de Computadors
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv 004
topic 004
description Contributory and volunteer computing ecosystems built around a community of participants need, like any other common-pool resources, an adaptive governance mechanism to guarantee the sustainability of the ecosystem. Reciprocity incentive mechanisms based on economic principles have been proved efficient solutions to regulate the resource sharing and allocation in large computing architectures, guaranteeing a direct retribution for each individual contribution even in presence of misbehaving users. However, while these mechanisms preserve the macro-equilibrium of the computational shared resources (e.g., CPU or memory), participants with fewer resources face problems competing for the attention of other members with more resources to cooperate with; making it difficult to apply such principles in practice. Additionally, active members of the community contributingin other aspects (e.g., doing administrative tasks or developing software) are not contemplated in traditional schemes although their time and effort are also part of the common-pool resource and hence, should be retributed somehow. The aim of this thesis is to revisit some of the architectural aspects of current systems and propose a framework to govern contributory and volunteer computing ecosystems in a fairer way based on principles of participatory economics. Our main contributions in this thesis are threefold. First, we examine the mechanisms ruling the resource sharing and propose a new reciprocal incentive mechanism that measures participants¿ effort on sharing resources instead of their direct contribution, so it increases the collaboration opportunities of users with fewer resources in heterogeneous scenarios. Second, we propose a regulation mechanism for allocating new computational devices and distribute new resources within them, with the objective of increasing their impact in the common-pool resources when the demand of resources is supplied by the community. Third, we propose new methods to detect and analyze the social positions and roles of the community members, enabling the governance mechanism to be adapted taking into account members' effort on several tasks not considered otherwise. The main contributions of this thesis conform a single framework that has been tested experimentally, using simulations, in a resource-sharing environment with non-strategic participants. Potentially, the mechanisms developed in this thesis will open new opportunities to apply political-economic and social ideas to the new generation of volunteer, contributory or grid computing systems; as well as other commonpool resources scenarios.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2015
2016
2016
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format doctoralThesis
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10803/336680
https://dx.doi.org/10.5821/dissertation-2117-96062
url http://hdl.handle.net/10803/336680
https://dx.doi.org/10.5821/dissertation-2117-96062
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/es/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/es/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv 205 p.
application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv TDX (Tesis Doctorals en Xarxa)
reponame:TDR. Tesis Doctorales en Red
instname:CBUC, CESCA
instname_str CBUC, CESCA
reponame_str TDR. Tesis Doctorales en Red
collection TDR. Tesis Doctorales en Red
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1869417378614345728
spelling Incentives for sharing heterogeneous resources in distributed systems : a participatory approachVega D'Aurelio, Davide004Contributory and volunteer computing ecosystems built around a community of participants need, like any other common-pool resources, an adaptive governance mechanism to guarantee the sustainability of the ecosystem. Reciprocity incentive mechanisms based on economic principles have been proved efficient solutions to regulate the resource sharing and allocation in large computing architectures, guaranteeing a direct retribution for each individual contribution even in presence of misbehaving users. However, while these mechanisms preserve the macro-equilibrium of the computational shared resources (e.g., CPU or memory), participants with fewer resources face problems competing for the attention of other members with more resources to cooperate with; making it difficult to apply such principles in practice. Additionally, active members of the community contributingin other aspects (e.g., doing administrative tasks or developing software) are not contemplated in traditional schemes although their time and effort are also part of the common-pool resource and hence, should be retributed somehow. The aim of this thesis is to revisit some of the architectural aspects of current systems and propose a framework to govern contributory and volunteer computing ecosystems in a fairer way based on principles of participatory economics. Our main contributions in this thesis are threefold. First, we examine the mechanisms ruling the resource sharing and propose a new reciprocal incentive mechanism that measures participants¿ effort on sharing resources instead of their direct contribution, so it increases the collaboration opportunities of users with fewer resources in heterogeneous scenarios. Second, we propose a regulation mechanism for allocating new computational devices and distribute new resources within them, with the objective of increasing their impact in the common-pool resources when the demand of resources is supplied by the community. Third, we propose new methods to detect and analyze the social positions and roles of the community members, enabling the governance mechanism to be adapted taking into account members' effort on several tasks not considered otherwise. The main contributions of this thesis conform a single framework that has been tested experimentally, using simulations, in a resource-sharing environment with non-strategic participants. Potentially, the mechanisms developed in this thesis will open new opportunities to apply political-economic and social ideas to the new generation of volunteer, contributory or grid computing systems; as well as other commonpool resources scenarios.Els sistemes de computació voluntària o contributiva construïts al voltant de comunitats de participants necessiten, com qualsevol altre common-pool resource, mecanismes de govern adaptatius que garanteixin la sostenibilitat de l'ecosistema. Els incentius recíprocs basats en principis econòmics han demostrat ser solucions eficients per regular la compartició i assignació de recursos en arquitectures de gran escala, garantint una retribució directa per cada contribució, inclús en presència d’usuaris maliciosos. No obstant això, mentre aquests mecanismes preserven el macro equilibri dels recursos compartits (p. ex., CPU o memòria), els participants amb menys recursos tenen problemes per competir per l'atenció dels altres membres amb més recursos quan volen cooperar amb ells; fent difícil en la pràctica aplicar aquests principis. A més a més, els membres actius de la comunitat contribuint en altres aspectes (p. ex., realitzant tasques administratives, o desenvolupant software) no es torben contemplats en els esquemes tradicions tot i que el seu temps i esforç també son part del common-pool resource i, per tant, haurien de ser compensats. L'objectiu d'aquesta tesi és revisar alguns dels aspectes d’arquitectura que fan que aquestes estratègies no funcionin i proposar un framework per governar ecosistemes de computació voluntària o contributiva duna manera més justa utilitzant principis de participació econòmica. Primer, examinem els mecanismes que controlen la compartició de recursos i proposem un nou mecanisme d’incentiu recíproc que mesura l'esforç dels participants mentre comparteixen recursos en comptes de la seva contribució directa, de manera que les oportunitats per cooperar incrementen pels usuaris amb menys recursos. En segon lloc, proposem un mecanisme per regular l'assignació de noves màquines de computació i recursos, amb l'objectiu de millorar el seu impacte en escenaris amb common-pool resource quan la demanda de recursos ha de ser subministrada col·lectivament. Tercer, proposem nous mètodes per detectar i analitzar els rols i posicions socials dels membres de la comunitat, permetent que els mecanismes de govern es puguin adaptar tenint en compte l'esforç dels participants en altres tipus de tasques prèviament no contemplades. Les principals contribucions d'aquesta tesi formen un únic framework que ha estat provat experimentalment, utilitzant simulacions, en un escenari cooperatiu amb participants no estratègics. Potencialment, els mecanismes desenvolupats en aquesta tesi obriran noves oportunitats per aplicar idees politico-econòmiques i socials a la nova generació de sistemes de computació voluntària, cooperativa o grid, així com escenaris common-pool resource.DOCTORAT EN ARQUITECTURA DE COMPUTADORS (Pla 2007)Universitat Politècnica de CatalunyaFreitag, FelixMeseguer Pallarès, RocUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament d'Arquitectura de Computadors201620162015info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion205 p.application/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10803/336680https://dx.doi.org/10.5821/dissertation-2117-96062TDX (Tesis Doctorals en Xarxa)reponame:TDR. Tesis Doctorales en Redinstname:CBUC, CESCAInglésL'accés als continguts d'aquesta tesi queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/es/http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/es/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:www.tdx.cat:10803/3366802026-06-14T12:46:07Z
score 15.301603

Similares en LA Referencia