Negotiating religious exemptions: a public reason perspective
In this thesis I elaborate on three reasons why religious exemptions from generally applicable laws are not publicly justifiable in a liberal democratic society. First, mere claims of the form “God says so and my conscience requires that I obey” do not explicate the rationale behind the legal provis...
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| Tipo de recurso: | tesis doctoral |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2019 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | CBUC, CESCA |
| Repositorio: | TDR. Tesis Doctorales en Red |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:www.tdx.cat:10803/667498 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10803/667498 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Claims of conscience Legitimacy Public reason Religious liberty Religious exemptions Reclamos de conciencia Legitimidad Razón pública Libertad religiosa Exenciones religiosas 32 |
| Sumario: | In this thesis I elaborate on three reasons why religious exemptions from generally applicable laws are not publicly justifiable in a liberal democratic society. First, mere claims of the form “God says so and my conscience requires that I obey” do not explicate the rationale behind the legal provisions that they are expected to support. Therefore, such claims cannot be regarded even as pro tanto justificatory reasons for any legal provisions, be it laws or exemptions. Second, no matter how elaborate they are, reasons based on religious faith cannot be allowed in public justification of exemptions because such reasons involve non-negotiable claims about final values, which is incompatible with respect for fellow citizens as equal co-legislators. Third, even if religious arguments are allowed in public justification, carving out religious exemptions from generally applicable laws is still impermissible because it arbitrarily bends the sovereign will of the people to the dictate of religious doctrines. |
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