Essays in non-market strategies
This dissertation consists of three papers examining the implications of non-market strategies in corporations and mutual funds. The first chapter quantifies the importance of political connections to congressional committee members for firms’ market power in the United States. For identification, w...
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| Tipo de recurso: | tesis doctoral |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2023 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | CBUC, CESCA |
| Repositorio: | TDR. Tesis Doctorales en Red |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:www.tdx.cat:10803/690031 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10803/690031 |
| Access Level: | acceso embargado |
| Palabra clave: | Non-market strategies Political connections Market power Procurement Mutual-fund disclosures ESG labels ESG ratings ESG voting UNPRI Greenwashing Sustainability Corporate headquarters Performance Financing Crisis Estratègies no de mercat Connexions polítiques Poder de mercat Adquisició Divulgacions de fons d’inversió Etiquetes ESG Qualificacions ESG Votació ESG Sostenibilitat Seu corporativa Rendiment Financament Crisi 33 |
| Sumario: | This dissertation consists of three papers examining the implications of non-market strategies in corporations and mutual funds. The first chapter quantifies the importance of political connections to congressional committee members for firms’ market power in the United States. For identification, we exploit a congressional procedure (committee exile) that leads to quasi-exogenous variations in a committee member’s political influence, and thus in a firm’s political connections. We find that, on average, 10% more political connections to important committee members increases firm-level mark-ups by 0.58 percentage point for US public firms. The share of values of government procurement contracts over sales is too small to explain the effect. To estimate the effects of a firm’s political influence on its competitors, we develop a general equilibrium model with both competition for political influence that helps firms ease bureaucratic and regulatory burden following Grossman and Helpman (1994), and competition for market share following Atkeson and Burstein (2008). The model highlights how political connections influence firm market power and economic aggregates. |
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