Per una rilettura kantiana del principio di causalità
There is no contradiction between Kant’s statement that the proposition, “every alteration has its cause,” is of no interest to the <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i> because of its dependence on empirical contents (KrV, B 3) and his use of the same proposition as an example of pure a priori...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2018 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Navarra |
| Repositorio: | Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra |
| Idioma: | italiano |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:dadun.unav.edu:10171/61009 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10171/61009 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Sumario: | There is no contradiction between Kant’s statement that the proposition, “every alteration has its cause,” is of no interest to the <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i> because of its dependence on empirical contents (KrV, B 3) and his use of the same proposition as an example of pure a priori knowledge (KrV, B 5). There is only the arduousness and sometimes also the ambiguity of a passage in which Kant attempts to establish a new basis for the validity of the principle of causality. |
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