Silenced contestation?
The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) has marked a transformative development in the European Union (EU)'s economic governance. Its ambition prompted tense negotiations at EU level. Yet implementation within member states has proceeded with remarkably little contestation. This article exam...
| Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | article |
| Publication Date: | 2026 |
| Country: | España |
| Institution: | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| Repository: | Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB |
| Language: | English |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:dnet:uabarcelona_::b3b19b06a860dee8bc4e736b16098fb8 |
| Online Access: | https://ddd.uab.cat/record/327079 https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1080/13501763.2026.2642360 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Contestation National recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs) Recovery and resilience facility (RRF) Implementation Italy Spain |
| Summary: | The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) has marked a transformative development in the European Union (EU)'s economic governance. Its ambition prompted tense negotiations at EU level. Yet implementation within member states has proceeded with remarkably little contestation. This article examines the puzzle of the RRF's 'quiet implementation' at national level. Drawing on an analytical framework that contrasts democratic legitimacy (the involvement of parliaments, political parties and subnational authorities) with technocratic legitimacy (executive authority and delegation to experts), it analyses two critical cases - Spain and Italy. As the largest recipients of RRF funding, both are highly exposed to EU conditionality and characterised by high public debt, fragmented party politics, government instability and strong regional authority. Given these features, one would expect substantial politicisation. Yet we find that in neither case did meaningful contestation emerge. We argue that this outcome stems from domestic institutional arrangements that foster depoliticisation by centralising decision-making within the executive and limiting parliamentary and subnational involvement in the implementation process - dynamics that prime ministerial offices could strategically exploit. We conclude by linking these findings to wider patterns of RRF implementation and EU economic governance, specifying the conditions under which executives can shield large-scale spending programmes from political debate. |
|---|